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Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2013 14:35:14 -0400
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Kay Sievers <kay@...y.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kmsg: honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on /dev/kmsg
On Tue, Apr 30, 2013 at 10:25:41AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> To fix /dev/kmsg, let's compare the existing interfaces and what they allow:
>
> - /proc/kmsg allows:
> - open (SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN) if CAP_SYSLOG since it uses a destructive
> single-reader interface (SYSLOG_ACTION_READ).
> - everything, after an open.
>
> - syslog syscall allows:
> - anything, if CAP_SYSLOG.
> - SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL and SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER, if dmesg_restrict==0.
> - nothing else (EPERM).
>
> The use-cases were:
> - dmesg(1) needs to do non-destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALLs.
> - sysklog(1) needs to open /proc/kmsg, drop privs, and still issue the
> destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READs.
>
> AIUI, dmesg(1) is moving to /dev/kmsg, and systemd-journald doesn't
> clear the ring buffer.
>
> Based on the comments in devkmsg_llseek, it sounds like actions besides
> reading aren't going to be supported by /dev/kmsg (i.e. SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR),
> so we have a strict subset of the non-destructive syslog syscall actions.
>
> To this end, move the check as Josh had done, but also rename the constants
> to reflect their new uses (SYSLOG_FROM_CALL becomes SYSLOG_FROM_READER, and
> SYSLOG_FROM_FILE becomes SYSLOG_FROM_PROC). SYSLOG_FROM_READER allows
> non-destructive actions, and SYSLOG_FROM_PROC allows destructive actions
> after a capabilities-constrained SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN check.
>
> - /dev/kmsg allows:
> - open if CAP_SYSLOG or dmesg_restrict==0
> - reading/polling, after open
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Reported-by: Christian Kujau <lists@...dbynature.de>
> Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>
> Cc: Kay Sievers <kay@...y.org>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
So staring at this for a while, I think it looks correct. It's
basically the same thing as the v3 I sent out, with the constant rename
and no check in devkmsg_read, right?
I'll try and get it tested here locally tomorrow.
josh
> ---
> fs/proc/kmsg.c | 10 +++---
> include/linux/syslog.h | 4 +--
> kernel/printk.c | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
> 3 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/kmsg.c b/fs/proc/kmsg.c
> index bd4b5a7..bdfabda 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/kmsg.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/kmsg.c
> @@ -21,12 +21,12 @@ extern wait_queue_head_t log_wait;
>
> static int kmsg_open(struct inode * inode, struct file * file)
> {
> - return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE);
> + return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC);
> }
>
> static int kmsg_release(struct inode * inode, struct file * file)
> {
> - (void) do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE);
> + (void) do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC);
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -34,15 +34,15 @@ static ssize_t kmsg_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
> size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
> {
> if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) &&
> - !do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE))
> + !do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC))
> return -EAGAIN;
> - return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ, buf, count, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE);
> + return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ, buf, count, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC);
> }
>
> static unsigned int kmsg_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
> {
> poll_wait(file, &log_wait, wait);
> - if (do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE))
> + if (do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC))
> return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
> return 0;
> }
> diff --git a/include/linux/syslog.h b/include/linux/syslog.h
> index 3891139..98a3153 100644
> --- a/include/linux/syslog.h
> +++ b/include/linux/syslog.h
> @@ -44,8 +44,8 @@
> /* Return size of the log buffer */
> #define SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER 10
>
> -#define SYSLOG_FROM_CALL 0
> -#define SYSLOG_FROM_FILE 1
> +#define SYSLOG_FROM_READER 0
> +#define SYSLOG_FROM_PROC 1
>
> int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int count, bool from_file);
>
> diff --git a/kernel/printk.c b/kernel/printk.c
> index abbdd9e..53b5c5e 100644
> --- a/kernel/printk.c
> +++ b/kernel/printk.c
> @@ -368,6 +368,53 @@ static void log_store(int facility, int level,
> log_next_seq++;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
> +int dmesg_restrict = 1;
> +#else
> +int dmesg_restrict;
> +#endif
> +
> +static int syslog_action_restricted(int type)
> +{
> + if (dmesg_restrict)
> + return 1;
> + /*
> + * Unless restricted, we allow "read all" and "get buffer size"
> + * for everybody.
> + */
> + return type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL &&
> + type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER;
> +}
> +
> +static int check_syslog_permissions(int type, bool from_file)
> +{
> + /*
> + * If this is from /proc/kmsg and we've already opened it, then we've
> + * already done the capabilities checks at open time.
> + */
> + if (from_file && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (syslog_action_restricted(type)) {
> + if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
> + return 0;
> + /*
> + * For historical reasons, accept CAP_SYS_ADMIN too, with
> + * a warning.
> + */
> + if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
> + printk_once(KERN_WARNING "%s (%d): "
> + "Attempt to access syslog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN "
> + "but no CAP_SYSLOG (deprecated).\n",
> + current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
> + return 0;
> + }
> + return -EPERM;
> + }
> + return security_syslog(type);
> +}
> +
> +
> /* /dev/kmsg - userspace message inject/listen interface */
> struct devkmsg_user {
> u64 seq;
> @@ -624,7 +671,8 @@ static int devkmsg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY)
> return 0;
>
> - err = security_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL);
> + err = check_syslog_permissions(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL,
> + SYSLOG_FROM_READER);
> if (err)
> return err;
>
> @@ -817,45 +865,6 @@ static inline void boot_delay_msec(int level)
> }
> #endif
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
> -int dmesg_restrict = 1;
> -#else
> -int dmesg_restrict;
> -#endif
> -
> -static int syslog_action_restricted(int type)
> -{
> - if (dmesg_restrict)
> - return 1;
> - /* Unless restricted, we allow "read all" and "get buffer size" for everybody */
> - return type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER;
> -}
> -
> -static int check_syslog_permissions(int type, bool from_file)
> -{
> - /*
> - * If this is from /proc/kmsg and we've already opened it, then we've
> - * already done the capabilities checks at open time.
> - */
> - if (from_file && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN)
> - return 0;
> -
> - if (syslog_action_restricted(type)) {
> - if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
> - return 0;
> - /* For historical reasons, accept CAP_SYS_ADMIN too, with a warning */
> - if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
> - printk_once(KERN_WARNING "%s (%d): "
> - "Attempt to access syslog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN "
> - "but no CAP_SYSLOG (deprecated).\n",
> - current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
> - return 0;
> - }
> - return -EPERM;
> - }
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> #if defined(CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME)
> static bool printk_time = 1;
> #else
> @@ -1253,7 +1262,7 @@ out:
>
> SYSCALL_DEFINE3(syslog, int, type, char __user *, buf, int, len)
> {
> - return do_syslog(type, buf, len, SYSLOG_FROM_CALL);
> + return do_syslog(type, buf, len, SYSLOG_FROM_READER);
> }
>
> /*
> --
> 1.7.9.5
>
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Chrome OS Security
--
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