| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <3133489.jB2ld18Orb@x2>
Date: Thu, 09 May 2013 09:29:18 -0400
From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>
To: linux-audit@...hat.com
Cc: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] [BZ905179] audit: omit check for uid and gid validity in audit rules and data
On Tuesday, April 16, 2013 03:38:23 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 09, 2013 at 02:39:32AM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> > Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org> writes:
> > > On Wed, 20 Mar 2013 15:18:17 -0400 Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
wrote:
> > >> audit rule additions containing "-F auid!=4294967295" were failing with
> > >> EINVAL.>
> > The only case where this appears to make the least little bit of sense
> > is if the goal of the test is to test to see if an audit logloginuid
> > has been set at all. In which case depending on a test against
> > 4294967295 is bogus because you are depending on an intimate internal
> > kernel implementation detail.
> >
> > How about something like my untested patch below that add an explicit
> > operation to test if loginuid has been set?
>
> Sorry for the delay in testing this, I had another urgent bug and a
> belligerent test box...
>
> I like this approach better than mine now that I understand it. I've
> tested the patch below without any changes. It works as expected with
> my previous test case. I don't know if a Signed-off-by: is appropriate
> for me in this case, but I'll throw in a:
>
> Tested-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rbriggs@...hat.com>
>
> and recommend a:
>
> Reported-By: Steve Grubb <sbrubb@...hat.com>
If this is the approved patch, can it be put in stable? The audit system
hasn't worked as intended since January.
Thanks,
-Steve
> > From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
> > Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2013 02:22:10 -0700
> > Subject: [PATCH] audit: Make testing for a valid loginuid explicit.
> >
> > audit rule additions containing "-F auid!=4294967295" were failing
> > with EINVAL.
> >
> > Apparently some userland audit rule sets want to know if loginuid uid
> > has been set and are using a test for auid != 4294967295 to determine
> > that.
> >
> > In practice that is a horrible way to ask if a value has been set,
> > because it relies on subtle implementation details and will break
> > every time the uid implementation in the kernel changes.
> >
> > So add a clean way to test if the audit loginuid has been set, and
> > silently convert the old idiom to the cleaner and more comprehensible
> > new idiom.
> >
> > Reported-By: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com> wrote:
> > Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
> > ---
> >
> > include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++++
> > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> > kernel/auditfilter.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > kernel/auditsc.c | 5 ++++-
> > 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> > index a9fefe2..8a1ddde 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> > @@ -390,6 +390,11 @@ static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct
> > *t)
> >
> > #define audit_signals 0
> > #endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
> >
> > +static inline bool audit_loginuid_set(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > +{
> > + return uid_valid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
> > +}
> > +
> >
> > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
> > /* These are defined in audit.c */
> >
> > /* Public API */
> >
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> > index 9f096f1..9554a19 100644
> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> > @@ -246,6 +246,7 @@
> >
> > #define AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE 21
> > #define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW 22
> > #define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH 23
> >
> > +#define AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET 24
> >
> > /* These are ONLY useful when checking
> >
> > * at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> > index 540f986..6381d17 100644
> > --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> > +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> > @@ -349,6 +349,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct
> > audit_rule *rule)>
> > if (f->op == Audit_bad)
> >
> > goto exit_free;
> >
> > + /* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */
> > + if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == 4294967295)) {
> > + f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET;
> > + f->val = 0;
> > + }
> > +
> >
> > switch(f->type) {
> >
> > default:
> > goto exit_free;
> >
> > @@ -377,6 +383,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct
> > audit_rule *rule)>
> > if (!gid_valid(f->gid))
> >
> > goto exit_free;
> >
> > break;
> >
> > + case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
> > + if ((f->op != Audit_not_equal) && (f->op != Audit_equal))
> > + goto exit_free;
> > + if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1))
> > + goto exit_free;
> > + break;
> >
> > case AUDIT_PID:
> > case AUDIT_PERS:
> >
> > case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
> > @@ -459,6 +471,13 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct
> > audit_rule_data *data,>
> > f->gid = INVALID_GID;
> > f->lsm_str = NULL;
> > f->lsm_rule = NULL;
> >
> > +
> > + /* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */
> > + if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == 4294967295)) {
> > + f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET;
> > + f->val = 0;
> > + }
> > +
> >
> > switch(f->type) {
> > case AUDIT_UID:
> >
> > case AUDIT_EUID:
> > @@ -487,6 +506,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct
> > audit_rule_data *data,>
> > if (!gid_valid(f->gid))
> >
> > goto exit_free;
> >
> > break;
> >
> > + case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
> > + if ((f->op != Audit_not_equal) && (f->op != Audit_equal))
> > + goto exit_free;
> > + if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1))
> > + goto exit_free;
> > + break;
> >
> > case AUDIT_PID:
> > case AUDIT_PERS:
> >
> > case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
> > @@ -1380,6 +1405,10 @@ static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct
> > audit_krule *rule,>
> > result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(current),
> >
> > f->op, f->uid);
> >
> > break;
> >
> > + case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
> > + result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(current),
> > + f->op, f->val);
> > + break;
> >
> > case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
> > case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> >
> > case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > index 3a11d34..27d0a50 100644
> > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > @@ -750,6 +750,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> >
> > if (ctx)
> >
> > result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op,
f->uid);
> >
> > break;
> >
> > + case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
> > + result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op,
f->val);
> > + break;
> >
> > case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
> > case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> >
> > case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> > @@ -2317,7 +2320,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
> >
> > unsigned int sessionid;
> >
> > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE
> >
> > - if (uid_valid(task->loginuid))
> > + if (audit_loginuid_set(task))
> >
> > return -EPERM;
> >
> > #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
> >
> > if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
>
> - RGB
>
> --
> Richard Guy Briggs <rbriggs@...hat.com>
> Senior Software Engineer
> AMER ENG Base Operating Systems
> Remote, Canada, Ottawa
> Voice: 1.647.777.2635
> Internal: (81) 32635
>
> --
> Linux-audit mailing list
> Linux-audit@...hat.com
> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists