[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <51A062B5.8040601@redhat.com>
Date: Sat, 25 May 2013 09:05:25 +0200
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
CC: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>,
lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: PING^7 (was Re: [PATCH v2 00/14] Corrections and customization
of the SG_IO command whitelist (CVE-2012-4542))
Il 25/05/2013 07:27, Christoph Hellwig ha scritto:
> On Fri, May 24, 2013 at 09:35:02PM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
>> I'll go along with this. I'm also wondering what the problem would be
>> if we just allowed all commands on either CAP_SYS_RAWIO or opening the
>> device for write, so we just defer to the filesystem permissions and
>> restricted read only opens to the basic all device opcodes.
>
> I've been out of this area for a bit, but the problem used to be that
> you could send destructive commands to a partition. The right fix
> for that would be to not allow SG_IO on partitions at all, just
> wondering if anything would be broken by this.
Linus wanted to keep that for CAP_SYS_RAWIO. We found two uses of SG_IO
on partitions: zfs-fuse used SYNCHRONIZE CACHE; some proprietary driver
used TEST UNIT READY.
Really, the solution is to make the bitmaps configurable in userspace.
It is no less secure than unpriv_sgio. Then the kernel can be
configured at build-time to have either an MMC bitmap and a basic
whitelist of a dozen commands. We can even avoid working around those
few conflicting opcodes; if you're paranoid you can just configure your
kernel right.
Paolo
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists