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Message-Id: <20130605213221.946358177@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2013 14:33:22 -0700
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>,
Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: [ 035/127] random: fix accounting race condition with lockless irq entropy_count update
3.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
commit 10b3a32d292c21ea5b3ad5ca5975e88bb20b8d68 upstream.
Commit 902c098a3663 ("random: use lockless techniques in the interrupt
path") turned IRQ path from being spinlock protected into lockless
cmpxchg-retry update.
That commit removed r->lock serialization between crediting entropy bits
from IRQ context and accounting when extracting entropy on userspace
read path, but didn't turn the r->entropy_count reads/updates in
account() to use cmpxchg as well.
It has been observed, that under certain circumstances this leads to
read() on /dev/urandom to return 0 (EOF), as r->entropy_count gets
corrupted and becomes negative, which in turn results in propagating 0
all the way from account() to the actual read() call.
Convert the accounting code to be the proper lockless counterpart of
what has been partially done by 902c098a3663.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 22 +++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -865,16 +865,24 @@ static size_t account(struct entropy_sto
if (r->entropy_count / 8 < min + reserved) {
nbytes = 0;
} else {
+ int entropy_count, orig;
+retry:
+ entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
/* If limited, never pull more than available */
- if (r->limit && nbytes + reserved >= r->entropy_count / 8)
- nbytes = r->entropy_count/8 - reserved;
+ if (r->limit && nbytes + reserved >= entropy_count / 8)
+ nbytes = entropy_count/8 - reserved;
- if (r->entropy_count / 8 >= nbytes + reserved)
- r->entropy_count -= nbytes*8;
- else
- r->entropy_count = reserved;
+ if (entropy_count / 8 >= nbytes + reserved) {
+ entropy_count -= nbytes*8;
+ if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
+ goto retry;
+ } else {
+ entropy_count = reserved;
+ if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
+ goto retry;
+ }
- if (r->entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_thresh)
+ if (entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_thresh)
wakeup_write = 1;
}
--
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