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Message-Id: <1371490288-23167-76-git-send-email-kamal@canonical.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2013 10:31:19 -0700
From: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@...onical.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-team@...ts.ubuntu.com
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Kay Sievers <kay@...y.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Kamal Mostafa <kamal@...onical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 75/84] kmsg: honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on /dev/kmsg
3.8.13.3 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
commit 637241a900cbd982f744d44646b48a273d609b34 upstream.
The dmesg_restrict sysctl currently covers the syslog method for access
dmesg, however /dev/kmsg isn't covered by the same protections. Most
people haven't noticed because util-linux dmesg(1) defaults to using the
syslog method for access in older versions. With util-linux dmesg(1)
defaults to reading directly from /dev/kmsg.
To fix /dev/kmsg, let's compare the existing interfaces and what they
allow:
- /proc/kmsg allows:
- open (SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN) if CAP_SYSLOG since it uses a destructive
single-reader interface (SYSLOG_ACTION_READ).
- everything, after an open.
- syslog syscall allows:
- anything, if CAP_SYSLOG.
- SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL and SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER, if
dmesg_restrict==0.
- nothing else (EPERM).
The use-cases were:
- dmesg(1) needs to do non-destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALLs.
- sysklog(1) needs to open /proc/kmsg, drop privs, and still issue the
destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READs.
AIUI, dmesg(1) is moving to /dev/kmsg, and systemd-journald doesn't
clear the ring buffer.
Based on the comments in devkmsg_llseek, it sounds like actions besides
reading aren't going to be supported by /dev/kmsg (i.e.
SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR), so we have a strict subset of the non-destructive
syslog syscall actions.
To this end, move the check as Josh had done, but also rename the
constants to reflect their new uses (SYSLOG_FROM_CALL becomes
SYSLOG_FROM_READER, and SYSLOG_FROM_FILE becomes SYSLOG_FROM_PROC).
SYSLOG_FROM_READER allows non-destructive actions, and SYSLOG_FROM_PROC
allows destructive actions after a capabilities-constrained
SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN check.
- /dev/kmsg allows:
- open if CAP_SYSLOG or dmesg_restrict==0
- reading/polling, after open
Addresses https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=903192
[akpm@...ux-foundation.org: use pr_warn_once()]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Reported-by: Christian Kujau <lists@...dbynature.de>
Tested-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay@...y.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@...onical.com>
---
fs/proc/kmsg.c | 10 +++---
include/linux/syslog.h | 4 +--
kernel/printk.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
3 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/kmsg.c b/fs/proc/kmsg.c
index bd4b5a7..bdfabda 100644
--- a/fs/proc/kmsg.c
+++ b/fs/proc/kmsg.c
@@ -21,12 +21,12 @@ extern wait_queue_head_t log_wait;
static int kmsg_open(struct inode * inode, struct file * file)
{
- return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE);
+ return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC);
}
static int kmsg_release(struct inode * inode, struct file * file)
{
- (void) do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE);
+ (void) do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC);
return 0;
}
@@ -34,15 +34,15 @@ static ssize_t kmsg_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) &&
- !do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE))
+ !do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC))
return -EAGAIN;
- return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ, buf, count, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE);
+ return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ, buf, count, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC);
}
static unsigned int kmsg_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
poll_wait(file, &log_wait, wait);
- if (do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE))
+ if (do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC))
return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/syslog.h b/include/linux/syslog.h
index 3891139..98a3153 100644
--- a/include/linux/syslog.h
+++ b/include/linux/syslog.h
@@ -44,8 +44,8 @@
/* Return size of the log buffer */
#define SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER 10
-#define SYSLOG_FROM_CALL 0
-#define SYSLOG_FROM_FILE 1
+#define SYSLOG_FROM_READER 0
+#define SYSLOG_FROM_PROC 1
int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int count, bool from_file);
diff --git a/kernel/printk.c b/kernel/printk.c
index 267ce78..0f0ac58 100644
--- a/kernel/printk.c
+++ b/kernel/printk.c
@@ -362,6 +362,53 @@ static void log_store(int facility, int level,
log_next_seq++;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
+int dmesg_restrict = 1;
+#else
+int dmesg_restrict;
+#endif
+
+static int syslog_action_restricted(int type)
+{
+ if (dmesg_restrict)
+ return 1;
+ /*
+ * Unless restricted, we allow "read all" and "get buffer size"
+ * for everybody.
+ */
+ return type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL &&
+ type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER;
+}
+
+static int check_syslog_permissions(int type, bool from_file)
+{
+ /*
+ * If this is from /proc/kmsg and we've already opened it, then we've
+ * already done the capabilities checks at open time.
+ */
+ if (from_file && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (syslog_action_restricted(type)) {
+ if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * For historical reasons, accept CAP_SYS_ADMIN too, with
+ * a warning.
+ */
+ if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ pr_warn_once("%s (%d): Attempt to access syslog with "
+ "CAP_SYS_ADMIN but no CAP_SYSLOG "
+ "(deprecated).\n",
+ current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ return security_syslog(type);
+}
+
+
/* /dev/kmsg - userspace message inject/listen interface */
struct devkmsg_user {
u64 seq;
@@ -618,7 +665,8 @@ static int devkmsg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY)
return 0;
- err = security_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL);
+ err = check_syslog_permissions(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL,
+ SYSLOG_FROM_READER);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -811,45 +859,6 @@ static inline void boot_delay_msec(int level)
}
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
-int dmesg_restrict = 1;
-#else
-int dmesg_restrict;
-#endif
-
-static int syslog_action_restricted(int type)
-{
- if (dmesg_restrict)
- return 1;
- /* Unless restricted, we allow "read all" and "get buffer size" for everybody */
- return type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER;
-}
-
-static int check_syslog_permissions(int type, bool from_file)
-{
- /*
- * If this is from /proc/kmsg and we've already opened it, then we've
- * already done the capabilities checks at open time.
- */
- if (from_file && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN)
- return 0;
-
- if (syslog_action_restricted(type)) {
- if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
- return 0;
- /* For historical reasons, accept CAP_SYS_ADMIN too, with a warning */
- if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
- printk_once(KERN_WARNING "%s (%d): "
- "Attempt to access syslog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN "
- "but no CAP_SYSLOG (deprecated).\n",
- current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
- return 0;
- }
- return -EPERM;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
#if defined(CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME)
static bool printk_time = 1;
#else
@@ -1247,7 +1256,7 @@ out:
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(syslog, int, type, char __user *, buf, int, len)
{
- return do_syslog(type, buf, len, SYSLOG_FROM_CALL);
+ return do_syslog(type, buf, len, SYSLOG_FROM_READER);
}
/*
--
1.8.1.2
--
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