Message-ID: <CAAAKZwv1CQbCOweUOcvFXtwDsMHB6Pay-fUqz-CNrcOAda8ghA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Fri, 28 Jun 2013 11:37:39 -0700
From:	Tim Hockin <thockin@...kin.org>
To:	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>
Cc:	Mike Galbraith <bitbucket@...ine.de>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
	Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@...y.org>,
	lpoetter <lpoetter@...hat.com>,
	workman-devel <workman-devel@...hat.com>,
	jpoimboe <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
	"dhaval.giani" <dhaval.giani@...il.com>,
	Cgroups <cgroups@...r.kernel.org>, vrigo <vrigo@...gle.com>,
	vmarmol@...gle.com
Subject: Re: cgroup access daemon

On Fri, Jun 28, 2013 at 9:31 AM, Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com> wrote:
> Quoting Tim Hockin (thockin@...kin.org):
>> On Thu, Jun 27, 2013 at 11:11 AM, Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com> wrote:
>> > Quoting Tim Hockin (thockin@...kin.org):
>> >
>> >> For our use case this is a huge problem.  We have people who access
>> >> cgroup files in a fairly tight loops, polling for information.  We
>> >> have literally hundeds of jobs running on sub-second frequencies -
>> >> plumbing all of that through a daemon is going to be a disaster.
>> >> Either your daemon becomes a bottleneck, or we have to build something
>> >> far more scalable than you really want to.  Not to mention the
>> >> inefficiency of inserting a layer.
>> >
>> > Currently you can trivially create a container which has the
>> > container's cgroups bind-mounted to the expected places
>> > (/sys/fs/cgroup/$controller) by uncommenting two lines in the
>> > configuration file, and handle cgroups through cgroupfs there.
>> > (This is what the management agent wants to be an alternative
>> > for)  The main deficiency there is that /proc/self/cgroups is
>> > not filtered, so it will show /lxc/c1 for init's cgroup, while
>> > the host's /sys/fs/cgroup/devices/lxc/c1/c1.real will be what
>> > is seen under the container's /sys/fs/cgroup/devices (for
>> > instance).  Not ideal.
>>
>> I'm really saying that if your daemon is to provide a replacement for
>> cgroupfs direct access, it needs to be designed to be scalable.  If
>> we're going to get away from bind mounting cgroupfs into user
>> namespaces, then let's try to solve ALL the problems.
>>
>> >> We also need the ability to set up eventfds for users or to let them
>> >> poll() on the socket from this daemon.
>> >
>> > So you'd want to be able to request updates when any cgroup value
>> > is changed, right?
>>
>> Not necessarily ANY, but that's the terminus of this API facet.
>>
>> > That's currently not in my very limited set of commands, but I can
>> > certainly add it, and yes it would be a simple unix sock so you can
>> > set up eventfd, select/poll, etc.
>>
>> Assuming the protocol is basically a pass-through to basic filesystem
>> ops, it should be pretty easy.  You just need to add it to your
>> protocol.
>>
>> But it brings up another point - access control.  How do you decide
>> which files a child agent should have access to?  Does that ever
>> change based on the child's configuration? In our world, the answer is
>> almost certainly yes.
>
> Could you give examples?
>
> If you have a white/academic paper I should go read, that'd be great.

We don't have anything on this, but examples may help.

Someone running as root should be able to connect to the "native"
daemon and read or write any cgroup file they want, right?  You could
argue that root should be able to do this to a child-daemon, too, but
let's ignore that.

But inside a container, I don't want the users to be able to write to
anything in their own container.  I do want them to be able to make
sub-cgroups, but only 5 levels deep.  For sub-cgroups, they should be
able to write to memory.limit_in_bytes, to read but not write
memory.soft_limit_in_bytes, and not be able to read memory.stat.

To get even fancier, a user should be able to create a sub-cgroup and
then designate that sub-cgroup as "final" - no further sub-sub-cgroups
allowed under it.  They should also be able to designate that a
sub-cgroup is "one-way" - once a process enters it, it can not leave.

These are real(ish) examples based on what people want to do today.
In particular, the last couple are things that we want to do, but
don't do today.

The particular policy can differ per-container.  Production jobs might
be allowed to create sub-cgroups, but batch jobs are not.  Some user
jobs are designated "trusted" in one facet or another and get more
(but still not full) access.

> At the moment I'm going on the naive belief that proper hierarchy
> controls will be enforced (eventually) by the kernel - i.e. if
> a task in cgroup /lxc/c1 is not allowed to mknod /dev/sda1, then it
> won't be possible for /lxc/c1/lxc/c2 to take that access.
>
> The native cgroup manager (the one using cgroupfs) will be checking
> the credentials of the requesting child manager for access(2) to
> the cgroup files.

This might be sufficient, or the basis for a sufficient access control
system for users.  The problem comes that we have multiple jobs on a
single machine running as the same user.  We need to ensure that the
jobs can not modify each other.

>> >> >> > So then the idea would be that userspace (like libvirt and lxc) would
>> >> >> > talk over /dev/cgroup to its manager.  Userspace inside a container
>> >> >> > (which can't actually mount cgroups itself) would talk to its own
>> >> >> > manager which is talking over a passed-in socket to the host manager,
>> >> >> > which in turn runs natively (uses cgroupfs, and nests "create /c1" under
>> >> >> > the requestor's cgroup).
>> >> >>
>> >> >> How do you handle updates of this agent?  Suppose I have hundreds of
>> >> >> running containers, and I want to release a new version of the cgroupd
>> >> >> ?
>> >> >
>> >> > This may change (which is part of what I want to investigate with some
>> >> > POC), but right now I'm building any controller-aware smarts into it.  I
>> >> > think that's what you're asking about?  The agent doesn't do "slices"
>> >> > etc.  This may turn out to be insufficient, we'll see.
>> >>
>> >> No, what I am asking is a release-engineering problem.  Suppose we
>> >> need to roll out a new version of this daemon (some new feature or a
>> >> bug or something).  We have hundreds of these "child" agents running
>> >> in the job containers.
>> >
>> > When I say "container" I mean an lxc container, with it's own isolated
>> > rootfs and mntns.  I'm not sure what your "containers" are, but I if
>> > they're not that, then they shouldn't need to run a child agent.  They
>> > can just talk over the host cgroup agent's socket.
>>
>> If they talk over the host agent's socket, where is the access control
>> and restriction done?  Who decides how deep I can nest groups?  Who
>> says which files I may access?  Who stops me from modifying someone
>> else's container?
>>
>> Our containers are somewhat thinner and more managed than LXC, but not
>> that much.  If we're running a system agent in a user container, we
>> need to manage that software.  We can't just start up a version and
>> leave it running until the user decides to upgrade - we force
>> upgrades.
>>
>> >> How do I bring down all these children, and then bring them back up on
>> >> a new version in a way that does not disrupt user jobs (much)?
>> >>
>> >> Similarly, what happens when one of these child agents crashes?  Does
>> >> someone restart it?  Do user jobs just stop working?
>> >
>> > An upstart^W$init_system job will restart it...
>>
>> What happens when the main agent crashes?  All those children on UNIX
>> sockets need to reconnect, I guess.  This means your UNIX socket needs
>> to be a named socket, not just a socketpair(),  making your auth model
>> more complicated.
>
> It is a named socket.

So anyone can connect?  even with SO_PEERCRED, how do you know which
branches of the cgroup tree I am allowed to modify if the same user
owns more than one?

>> What happens when the main agent hangs?  Is someone health-checking
>> it?  How about all the child daemons?
>>
>> I guess my main point is that this SOUNDS like a simple project, but
>
> I guess it's not "simple".  It just focuses on one specific problem.
>
>> if you just do the simple obvious things, it will be woefully
>> inadequate for anything but simple use-cases.  If we get forced into
>> such a model (and there are some good reasons to do it, even
>> disregarding all the other chatter), we'd rather use the same thing
>> that the upstream world uses, and not re-invent the whole thing
>> ourselves.
>>
>> Do you have a design spec, or a requirements list, or even a prototype
>> that we can look at?
>
> The readme at https://github.com/hallyn/cgroup-mgr/blob/master/README
> shows what I have in mind.  It (and the sloppy code next to it)
> represent a few hours' work over the last few days while waiting
> for compiles and in between emails...

Awesome.  Do you mind if we look?

> But again, it is completely predicated on my goal to have libvirt
> and lxc (and other cgroup users) be able to use the same library
> or API to make their requests whether they are on host or in a
> container, and regardless of the distro they're running under.

I think that is a good goal.  We'd like to not be different, if
possible.  Obviously, we can't impose our needs on you if you don't
want to handle them.  It sounds like what you are building is the
bottom layer in a stack - we (Google) should use that same bottom
layer.  But that can only happen iff you're open to hearing our
requirements.  Otherwise we have to strike out on our own or build
more layers in-between.

Tim
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