linux-kernel - Re: splice vs execve lockdep trace.

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Message-ID: <20130716053140.GK4165@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Date:	Tue, 16 Jul 2013 06:31:40 +0100
From:	Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
To:	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:	Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>,
	Linux Kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Ben Myers <bpm@....com>,
	xfs@....sgi.com
Subject: Re: splice vs execve lockdep trace.

On Mon, Jul 15, 2013 at 08:25:14PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:

> The "pipe -> cred_guard_mutex" lock chain is pretty direct, and can be
> clearly attributed to splicing into /proc. Now, whether that is a
> *good* idea or not is clearly debatable, and I do think that maybe we
> should just not splice to/from proc files, but that doesn't seem to be
> new, and I don't think it's necessarily *broken* per se, it's just
> that splicing into /proc seems somewhat unnecessary, and various proc
> files do end up taking locks that can be "interesting".

FWIW, we might attack that one - after all, we could have ->splice_write()
for that guy that would grab cred_guard_mutex, then call splice_from_pipe()
with actor that would map/do security_setprocattr/unmap...  Said that,
considering what it does on write, it really does *not* want to deal with
partial writes, so...
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