Date:	Fri, 26 Jul 2013 16:17:01 -0700
From:	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>
To:	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
CC:	LKLM <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	SE Linux <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 6/6] LSM: Multiple LSM Documentation and cleanup

On 07/25/13 11:32, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Subject: [PATCH v14 6/6] LSM: Multiple LSM Documentation and cleanup
> 
> Add documentation and remove the obsolete capability LSM.
> Clean up some comments in security.h
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
> 
> ---
>  Documentation/security/LSM.txt |   56 +-
>  include/linux/security.h       |   48 +-
>  security/Makefile              |    1 -
>  security/capability.c          | 1106 ----------------------------------------
>  4 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 1134 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/security/LSM.txt b/Documentation/security/LSM.txt
> index c335a76..69cf466 100644
> --- a/Documentation/security/LSM.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/security/LSM.txt
> @@ -7,20 +7,56 @@ various security checks to be hooked by new kernel extensions. The name
>  loadable kernel modules. Instead, they are selectable at build-time via
>  CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY and can be overridden at boot-time via the
>  "security=..." kernel command line argument, in the case where multiple
> -LSMs were built into a given kernel.
> +LSMs were built into a given kernel. The names of the active LSMs
> +can be read from /sys/kernel/security/lsm.
> +
> +Both CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY and the "security=" option take a comma
> +separated list of LSM names. The LSM hooks are invoked in the order
> +specified. All hooks provided are invoked regardless of the outcome
> +of preceding hooks. Hooks that return success or failure results
> +return success if all of the LSM provided hooks succeed and the error
> +code of the last failing hook on error.
> +
> +Information from an LSM can come in one of two forms. The raw data
> +used by the LSM is typically the preferred form. SELinux contexts and
> +Smack labels are examples of raw LSM data. If the data from multiple
> +LSMs is presented together it will be in the form:
> +
> +	lsmname='value'[lsmname='value']...

no commas? just (made up example):

	smack='label'selinux='notstrict'

> +
> +Interfaces that accept LSM data as input accept this format as well,
> +passing only the relevant portion of the data to each LSM.
> +
> +The /proc filesystem attribute interface supports files from a time
> +when only one LSM could be used at a time. CONFIG_PRESENT_SECURITY
> +defines which LSM uses these interfaces. The name of this LSM can be
> +read from /sys/kernel/security/present. There are also LSM identified
> +interfaces which should be used in preference to the undifferentiated
> +interfaces. The attribute interface "context" always provides the
> +data from all LSMs that maintain it in the lsmname='value' format.
> +
> +The three networking mechanisms supporting LSM attributes are
> +restricted to providing those attributes for a single LSM each.
> +CONFIG_SECMARK_LSM specifies which LSM will provide hooks for the
> +secmark mechanism. CONFIG_NETLABEL_LSM specifies which LSM hooks
> +are used by NetLabel to provide IPv4 CIPSO headers. CONFIG_XFRM_LSM
> +specifies the LSM providing xfrm hooks. CONFIG_PEERSEC_LSM allows
> +for either a specific LSM to provide data with SO_PEERSEC or for
> +all LSMs that provide data to do so.
> +
> +The Linux capabilities system is used in conjunction with any LSMs.
> +LSM hooks are called after the capability checks in most cases,
                        ^^^^^
> +but after in a small number of cases. All LSM hooks need to be aware
       ^^^^^

       one of these 'after's should be 'before' ??

> +of the potential interactions with the capability system. For more
> +details on capabilities, see capabilities(7) in the Linux man-pages
> +project.
>  
>  The primary users of the LSM interface are Mandatory Access Control
>  (MAC) extensions which provide a comprehensive security policy. Examples
>  include SELinux, Smack, Tomoyo, and AppArmor. In addition to the larger
> -MAC extensions, other extensions can be built using the LSM to provide
> -specific changes to system operation when these tweaks are not available
> -in the core functionality of Linux itself.
> -
> -Without a specific LSM built into the kernel, the default LSM will be the
> -Linux capabilities system. Most LSMs choose to extend the capabilities
> -system, building their checks on top of the defined capability hooks.
> -For more details on capabilities, see capabilities(7) in the Linux
> -man-pages project.
> +MAC extensions, other extensions such as Yama can be built using the LSM
> +to provide specific changes to system operation when these tweaks are not
> +available in the core functionality of Linux itself.
>  
>  Based on http://kerneltrap.org/Linux/Documenting_Security_Module_Intent,
>  a new LSM is accepted into the kernel when its intent (a description of


-- 
~Randy
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists