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Message-ID: <51FAA0CC.7010106@fifthhorseman.net>
Date: Thu, 01 Aug 2013 13:54:20 -0400
From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@...thhorseman.net>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
CC: keyrings@...ux-nfs.org, linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org, krbdev@....edu,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, simo@...hat.com,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] KEYS: Add per-user_namespace registers for persistent
per-UID kerberos caches
On 08/01/2013 01:39 PM, David Howells wrote:
> The uid is -1 or the user's own UID for the user's own cache or the uid of some
> other user's cache (requires CAP_SETUID). This permits rpc.gssd or whatever to
> mess with the cache.
Is the goal here eventually to be able to avoid the upcall to rpc.gssd
entirely? It seems a little bit roundabout to have the kernel call up
into userspace for the credentials, only to talk to a process which then
calls back into the kernel for something that the kernel has already
well-defined internally.
It seems like a non-privileged user could use this to store arbitrary
data in this keyring as a way of hiding what would otherwise be
filesystem activity or using it for some sort of odd/sneaky IPC
mechanism. Is this an intentional side effect?
Sorry if these are obvious questions. feel free to point me to
already-documented answers if they exist.
Thanks for all your work on this!
Regards,
--dkg
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