linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality}

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Message-ID: <20130826172054.GE27005@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Date:	Mon, 26 Aug 2013 18:20:55 +0100
From:	Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
To:	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc:	Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on
 /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality}

On Mon, Aug 26, 2013 at 09:49:48AM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:

> How does changing the permissions to S_IRUSR prevent someone from
> opening the file before, and reading the file after a suid exec?
> 
> > This patch restores the old mode which was 0400
> 
> Which seems to add no security whatsoever and obscure the fact that
> anyone who cares can read the file so what is the point?

Two words: "security sclerosis".  Both patches NAKed, of course.
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