[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CA+55aFzcPFXei5j-i49+3kXZ5L9S-v66vrzU091EuXkSeg1G7A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2013 10:37:57 -0700
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
"security@...nel.org" <security@...nel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] vfs: Tighten up linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH)
On Sun, Aug 25, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> So I'll just go back to square one, and wonder if we could/should just
> make the rule be that in order to be in that LAST_BIND case, you
> really have to have f_cred match your own credentials. Or have
> CAP_SEARCH.
Nope. That doesn't work. It breaks the chrome sandboxing.
Right now, following a /proc fd symlink requires ptrace access to the
process. Which is actually pretty strict, and makes sense. But it does
mean that there are other capabilities than CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH at
play.
I'm playing with a patch that then in addition to the ptrace check
*also* requires that the file was opened with the same credentials as
the follower _or_ the task being followed. I'll see if that works out.
Linus
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists