linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 0/10] Add additional security checks when module loading is restricted

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Message-ID: <1241952070.8587861.1377729463830.JavaMail.root@redhat.com>
Date:	Wed, 28 Aug 2013 18:37:43 -0400 (EDT)
From:	Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@...hat.com>
To:	Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, jwboyer@...hat.com,
	keescook@...omium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/10] Add additional security checks when module loading
 is restricted



----- Original Message -----
> From: "Matthew Garrett" <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
> To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, jwboyer@...hat.com, keescook@...omium.org
> Sent: Monday, August 19, 2013 1:26:01 PM
> Subject: [PATCH 0/10] Add additional security checks when module loading is restricted
> 
> We have two in-kernel mechanisms for restricting module loading - disabling
> it entirely, or limiting it to the loading of modules signed with a trusted
> key. These can both be configured in such a way that even root is unable to
> relax the restrictions.
> 
> However, right now, there's several other straightforward ways for root to
> modify running kernel code. At the most basic level these allow root to
> reset the configuration such that modules can be loaded again, rendering
> the existing restrictions useless.
> 
> This patchset adds additional restrictions to various kernel entry points
> that would otherwise make it straightforward for root to disable enforcement
> of module loading restrictions. It also provides a patch that allows the
> kernel to be configured such that module signing will be automatically
> enabled when the system is booting via UEFI Secure Boot, allowing a stronger
> guarantee of kernel integrity.
> 
> --
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> 

Did you purposely exclude similar checks for hibernate that were covered
by earlier versions of your patch set?

I think you should include it and any patch set that attempts to add support
for doing hibernate securely would make appropriate changes.

                              -Lenny.
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