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Message-ID: <20130901160429.GA1375@srcf.ucam.org>
Date:	Sun, 1 Sep 2013 17:04:29 +0100
From:	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
To:	Florian Weimer <fw@...eb.enyo.de>
Cc:	joeyli <jlee@...e.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-pm@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
	opensuse-kernel@...nsuse.org, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...k.pl>, Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>,
	Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>,
	Vojtech Pavlik <vojtech@...e.cz>,
	Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@...el.com>,
	James Bottomley <james.bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, JKosina@...e.com,
	Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Michal Marek <mmarek@...e.cz>,
	Gary Lin <GLin@...e.com>, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate
 snapshot

On Sun, Sep 01, 2013 at 12:41:22PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:

> But if you don't generate fresh keys on every boot, the persistent
> keys are mor exposed to other UEFI applications.  Correct me if I'm
> wrong, but I don't think UEFI variables are segregated between
> different UEFI applications, so if anyone gets a generic UEFI variable
> dumper (or setter) signed by the trusted key, this cryptographic
> validation of hibernate snapshots is bypassable.

If anyone can execute arbitrary code in your UEFI environment then 
you've already lost.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@...f.ucam.org
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