linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality}

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Message-ID: <877gf1pb7c.fsf@xmission.com>
Date:	Sat, 31 Aug 2013 18:44:39 -0700
From:	ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To:	Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>
Cc:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>,
	Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening\@lists.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality}

Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org> writes:

> (Sorry for my late response)
>
> On Thu, Aug 29, 2013 at 03:14:32PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Thu, Aug 29, 2013 at 2:11 AM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org> wrote:
>> > Hi Eric,
>> >
>> > On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 05:26:56PM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> >>
>> >> I have take a moment and read this thread, and have been completely
>> >> unenlightend.  People are upset but it is totally unclear why.
>> >>
>> >> There is no explanation why it is ok to ignore the suid-exec case, as
>> >> the posted patches do.  Which ultimately means the patches provide
>> > Please, did you take a look at the patches ?
>> > -       INF("syscall",    S_IRUGO, proc_pid_syscall),
>> > +       INF("syscall",    S_IRUSR, proc_pid_syscall),
>> >
>> > Can you please tell me how did you come to the conclusion that the
>> > patches "ignore the suid-exec case as the posted patches do" ?
>> 
>> There are a few conditions that need to be handled. The original fix
>> that Al landed was to stop this:
>> 
>> create IPC
>> fork child
>> child opens /proc/self/syscall
>> child sends fd to parent over IPC
>> child execs setuid process
>> parent reads setuid process's "syscall" file
>> 
>> The solution was to check perms of reader (in this case parent wasn't
>> privileged, so it gets denied).
> Yes, of course
>
>
>> The new problem is:
>> 
>> open /proc/$target/syscall
>> dup to stdin
>> exec setuid process that reports contents of stdin
>> 
>> So, changing perms to 0400 doesn't actually fix what we want to fix,
>> since it can still by bypassed under more limited situations:
>> 
>> open /proc/self/syscall
>> dup to stdin
>> exec setuid process that reports contents of stdin
>> 
>> So, changing to 0400 means only setuid programs that aren't already
>> running will have their ASLR leaked.
> Yes I do realize. That change was only to block leaks against already
> running processes and *restore* the old permissions.
>
>
>> [...] 
>> Maybe I'm lacking imagination, but changing to 0400 does reduce the
>> scope of the leak from all processes to "just" what was execed. This
>> still needs to be addressed, but I don't see a way to handle this
>> without explicitly invalidating the /proc handle across exec.
> Yes Kees,
>
> I did try a year ago to adapt the exec_id from grsecurity and failed
> (and failed again to resend - not enough resources):
> https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/3/10/174
>
>
> Kees IMHO the right solution is to invalidate the fd across exec as
> you suggest
>
> Alan Cox's thread which describe the problem correctly:
> https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/29/35
>
> Alan suggested to revoke() the file handles.

That was in particular with respect to /dev/mem.

In the general case calling setuid or any of it's cousins can cause the
same problem.  So a revoke that only works at exec time is insufficient.

The problem we are examining is what happens when the file descriptor is
passed to a more privileged process that will pass the ptrace_may_access
check while the original process that opened the file did not.

We have file->f_cred that has the permissions of the process at open
time, and likely that should factor into the calculations somehow.

Alternatively we may simply be able to call get_task_cred() at the time
we open the file and if the cred on the process changes fail.  I know
Linus was looking at something like that recently, but ran into problmes
with Chromes sandbox. (Sigh).  Although I think he was talking about
file->f_cred...

This is most definitely a solvable problem with current mechanisms, but
it is going to take some grunt work to make it happen.

Eric
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