[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLCTU1MG4fYDzpT=TAP9DRAUuRuhZNB+edJsOzN4iXbDw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2013 08:53:35 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Subject: Re:
On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 4:50 PM, Matthew Garrett
<matthew.garrett@...ula.com> wrote:
> We have two in-kernel mechanisms for restricting module loading - disabling
> it entirely, or limiting it to the loading of modules signed with a trusted
> key. These can both be configured in such a way that even root is unable to
> relax the restrictions.
>
> However, right now, there's several other straightforward ways for root to
> modify running kernel code. At the most basic level these allow root to
> reset the configuration such that modules can be loaded again, rendering
> the existing restrictions useless.
>
> This patchset adds additional restrictions to various kernel entry points
> that would otherwise make it straightforward for root to disable enforcement
> of module loading restrictions. It also provides a patch that allows the
> kernel to be configured such that module signing will be automatically
> enabled when the system is booting via UEFI Secure Boot, allowing a stronger
> guarantee of kernel integrity.
>
> V3 addresses some review feedback and also locks down uswsusp.
Looks good to me. Consider the entire series:
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists