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Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2013 16:34:07 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>
Cc: David Lang <david@...g.hm>,
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>,
"Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu" <Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"gregkh@...uxfoundation.org" <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
"hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
"jmorris@...ei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/12] One more attempt at useful kernel lockdown
On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 4:30 PM, James Bottomley
<James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com> wrote:
> On Mon, 2013-09-09 at 16:20 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 4:19 PM, David Lang <david@...g.hm> wrote:
>> > And if SELinux can do the job, what is the reason for creating this new
>> > option?
>>
>> Not everyone uses SELinux. :) Also, it's rarely controlled the things
>> we want to control here.
>
> It comes on by default (or its equivalent: AppArmour) in almost every
> shipping distro.
Right, if "LSM" was meant here, yeah, I do use an LSM. But they, as a
class of security policy in the kernel, handle isolation of entirely
different things. The goal of "no way to mess with ring-0" isn't
really related to the goals of the LSM in general, or specific MACs in
particular.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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