linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 00/12] One more attempt at useful kernel lockdown

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Date:	Tue, 10 Sep 2013 19:43:21 -0400
From:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc:	David Lang <david@...g.hm>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	"gregkh@...uxfoundation.org" <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>,
	Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@....eng.br>,
	"Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu" <Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
	"jmorris@...ei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/12] One more attempt at useful kernel lockdown

On Tue, 2013-09-10 at 12:44 -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 09/10/2013 12:17 PM, David Lang wrote:
> >>
> >> In theory these blobs are traceable to a manufacturer. It's not really
> >> an indication that it's "safe" more than it's an indication that it
> >> hasn't been changed. But I haven't chased this very hard yet because
> >> of below...
> > 
> > well, not if you are trying to defend against root breaking in to the
> > machine.
> > 
> 
> And we have at least some drivers where we even have the firmware in the
> Linux kernel tree, and thus aren't opaque blobs at all.
> 
> I suspect we'll need, at some point, a way for vendors that aren't
> already doing signatures on their firmware in a device-specific way to
> do so in a kernel-supported way.  The easiest (in terms of getting
> vendors to play along, not necessarily technically) might be a PGP
> signature (either inline or standalone) and have the public key as part
> of the driver?

Why invent yet another method of verifying the integrity of a file based
on a signature?  Why not use the existing method for appraising files?
Just create a new integrity hook at the appropriate place.

Mimi

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