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Message-ID: <20130919114202.GA12144@cachalot>
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2013 15:42:02 +0400
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
To: Christian Kujau <lists@...dbynature.de>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: proc hidepid=2 and SGID programs
On Sun, Sep 15, 2013 at 01:58 -0700, Christian Kujau wrote:
> Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> wrote:
> >> But still, I wonder if this is
> >> intended behaviour.
> >
> >Yes.
> >
> >If you think such side channel attacks are something you don't care,
> >just turn hidepid off. That's why it is an option.
> >
> >If you want to turn it off for some users, use gid=XXX.
>
> Maybe my initial question got lost in the noise: I merely wondered why "pgrep sgid-program" returned nothing but "kill pics off stiff program" was possible. Sure, if that's intended behavior, so be it. I just don't understand the (technical) reasoning behind this.
If process A may ptrace process B, A may kill B. In this case A may see
any information about B.
If process A may not ptrace process B, A probably still may kill B. But
A may not see any information about B.
In sense of information gathering hidepid doesn't differ setgid'ed
processes and common processes of another user. As *some* privileges
differ between a subject and an object, they are considered as being in
different security domains. Information leakage crossing the
interdomain border between these domains might help an attacker, so it
is denied.
--
Vasily Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
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