linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] printk: Check real user/group id for %pK

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Message-ID: <20130929234146.31004.qmail@science.horizon.com>
Date:	29 Sep 2013 19:41:46 -0400
From:	"George Spelvin" <linux@...izon.com>
To:	linux@...izon.com, rmallon@...il.com
Cc:	akpm@...ux-foundation.org, dan.j.rosenberg@...il.com,
	eldad@...refinery.com, jkosina@...e.cz,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] printk: Check real user/group id for %pK

> Right, so the pppd application is actually doing the correct thing.

And a CAP_SYSLOG setuid binary that *doesn't* DTRT seems like a more
immediate security hole than leaking kernel addresses.  After all
kptr_restrict is optional precisely because the benefit is marginal.

The interesting question is what credentials make sense for %pK outside
of a seq_printf().  Does it even make sense in a generic printk?  In that
case, it's the permission of the syslogd that matters rather than the
process generating the message.

> Will wait and see what others have to say.

Me, too.  Dan in particular.
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