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Date:	Wed, 02 Oct 2013 10:46:43 +0200
From:	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To:	Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>
CC:	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
	Gleb Natapov <gleb@...hat.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <michael@...erman.id.au>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, agraf@...e.de, mpm@...enic.com,
	herbert@...dor.hengli.com.au, linuxppc-dev@...abs.org,
	kvm@...r.kernel.org, kvm-ppc@...r.kernel.org, tytso@....edu
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add support for hwrng found on
 some powernv systems

Il 02/10/2013 07:09, Paul Mackerras ha scritto:
> On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 01:19:06PM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> 
>> Anyhow, I would like to know more about this hwrng and hypercall.
>>
>> Does the hwrng return random numbers (like rdrand) or real entropy (like
>> rdseed that Intel will add in Broadwell)?  What about the hypercall?
> 
> Well, firstly, your terminology is inaccurate.  Real entropy will give
> you random numbers.  I think when you say "random numbers" you
> actually mean "pseudo-random numbers".

Yes---I meant pseudo-random numbers where the generator is periodically
seeded by a random number.

> Secondly, the RNG produces real entropy.

Good to know, thanks.

> Not sure why they are particularly "precious"; we get 64 bits per
> microsecond whether we use them or not.  What are you suggesting
> arch_get_random_long() should do instead?

If you are running rngd, there is no need to have arch_get_random_long()
at all.

>> 3) If the hypercall returns random numbers, then it is a pretty
>> braindead interface since returning 8 bytes at a time limits the
>> throughput to a handful of MB/s (compare to 200 MB/sec for x86 rdrand).
>>  But more important: in this case drivers/char/hw_random/pseries-rng.c
>> is completely broken and insecure, just like patch 2 in case (1) above.
> 
> Assuming that by "random numbers" you actually mean "pseudo-random
> numbers", then this doesn't apply.

Indeed.

>> 4) If the hypercall returns entropy (same as virtio-rng), the same
>> considerations on speed apply.  If you can only produce entropy at say 1
>> MB/s (so reading 8 bytes take 8 microseconds---which is actually very
>> fast), it doesn't matter that much to spend 7 microseconds on a
>> userspace roundtrip.  It's going to be only half the speed of bare
>> metal, not 100 times slower.
> 
> 8 bytes takes at most 1 microsecond, so the round-trip to userspace is
> definitely noticeable.

Thanks.  Any chance you can give some numbers of a kernel hypercall and
a userspace hypercall on Power, so we have actual data?  For example a
hypercall that returns H_PARAMETER as soon as possible.

Paolo
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