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Message-ID: <20131002152210.GA15757@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2013 17:22:10 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@...gle.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"mingo@...e.hu" <mingo@...e.hu>,
"ak@...ux.intel.com" <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>,
David Ahern <dsahern@...il.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] perf: mmap2 not covering VM_CLONE regions
* Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 02:39:53PM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > - then there are timing attacks, and someone having access to a PMU
> > context and who can trigger this SHA1 computation arbitrarily in task
> > local context can run very accurate and low noise timing attacks...
> >
> > I don't think the kernel's sha_transform() is hardened against timing
> > attacks, it's performance optimized so it has variable execution time
> > highly dependent on plaintext input - which leaks information about the
> > plaintext.
>
> Typical user doesn't have enough priv to profile kernel space; once you
> do you also have enough priv to see kernel addresses outright (ie.
> kallsyms etc..).
I didn't mean profiling - that's not a 'timing attack'.
A simple RDTSC done around repeated calls to sha_transform() using kernel
functionality is.
Thanks,
Ingo
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