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Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2013 14:23:05 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: David Quigley <dpquigl@...equigley.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@...flux.net>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module-owner@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] LSM: MntRestrict blocks mounts on symlink targets
On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 9:02 AM, David Quigley <dpquigl@...equigley.com> wrote:
> Why is this an LSM and not something further up in the VFS? Why not make a
> sysctl for this and place it further up in the VFS? Has it already been
> rejected from there? If so why not include it in the things covered by Yama?
> From a code perspective I can't find anything wrong code wise but it seems
> odd to make a security module for something which is clearly a change to VFS
> semantics not really a security module.
There is this proposal:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-fsdevel&m=137876254501993&w=2
But we're looking for a way to disable it across the entire system.
Using the LSM hook proved extremely effective.
-Kees
>
>
> On 10/03/2013 16:56, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> Pinging on this too. Any feedback?
>>
>> -Kees
>>
>> On Sat, Sep 21, 2013 at 03:59:59PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>>>
>>> On systems where certain filesystem contents cannot be entirely trusted,
>>> it is beneficial to block mounts on symlinks. This makes sure that
>>> malicious filesystem contents cannot trigger the over-mounting of trusted
>>> filesystems. (For example, a bind-mounted subdirectory of /var cannot be
>>> redirected to mount on /etc via a symlink: a daemon cannot elevate privs
>>> to uid-0.)
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>>> ---
>>> security/Kconfig | 6 ++++
>>> security/Makefile | 2 ++
>>> security/mntrestrict/Kconfig | 13 ++++++++
>>> security/mntrestrict/Makefile | 1 +
>>> security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c | 63
>>> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> 5 files changed, 85 insertions(+)
>>> create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/Kconfig
>>> create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/Makefile
>>> create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c
>>>
>>> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
>>> index e9c6ac7..84d41f4 100644
>>> --- a/security/Kconfig
>>> +++ b/security/Kconfig
>>> @@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig
>>> source security/smack/Kconfig
>>> source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
>>> source security/apparmor/Kconfig
>>> +source security/mntrestrict/Kconfig
>>> source security/yama/Kconfig
>>>
>>> source security/integrity/Kconfig
>>> @@ -131,6 +132,7 @@ choice
>>> default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
>>> default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
>>> default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
>>> + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT if SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT
>>> default DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA if SECURITY_YAMA
>>> default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
>>>
>>> @@ -150,6 +152,9 @@ choice
>>> config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
>>> bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
>>>
>>> + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT
>>> + bool "MntRestrict" if SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT=y
>>> +
>>> config DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
>>> bool "Yama" if SECURITY_YAMA=y
>>>
>>> @@ -164,6 +169,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY
>>> default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
>>> default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
>>> default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
>>> + default "mntrestrict" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT
>>> default "yama" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
>>> default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
>>>
>>> diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
>>> index c26c81e..33f38b1 100644
>>> --- a/security/Makefile
>>> +++ b/security/Makefile
>>> @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux
>>> subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack
>>> subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo
>>> subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor
>>> +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT) += mntrestrict
>>> subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama
>>>
>>> # always enable default capabilities
>>> @@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) +=
>>> smack/built-in.o
>>> obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += lsm_audit.o
>>> obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o
>>> obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/built-in.o
>>> +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT) += mntrestrict/built-in.o
>>> obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/built-in.o
>>> obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
>>>
>>> diff --git a/security/mntrestrict/Kconfig b/security/mntrestrict/Kconfig
>>> new file mode 100644
>>> index 0000000..9a7310d
>>> --- /dev/null
>>> +++ b/security/mntrestrict/Kconfig
>>> @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
>>> +config SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT
>>> + bool "Restrict mounts on symlinks system-wide"
>>> + depends on SECURITY
>>> + help
>>> + Enforces that rule that symlinks cannot be used as mount
>>> + destinations across the entire system. This is to make sure
>>> + it is never possible to redirect locations using symlinks
>>> + when the process doing the mount may not be able to strictly
>>> + trust the contents of the filesystem where it is happening. For
>>> + example, making sure a bind mounted subdirectory in /var is not
>>> + redirected into /etc: stops a daemon without full privileges
>>> + from elevating to uid-0 by tricking the system init filesystem
>>> + mounting infrastructure.
>>> diff --git a/security/mntrestrict/Makefile
>>> b/security/mntrestrict/Makefile
>>> new file mode 100644
>>> index 0000000..340be1f
>>> --- /dev/null
>>> +++ b/security/mntrestrict/Makefile
>>> @@ -0,0 +1 @@
>>> +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT) += mntrestrict.o
>>> diff --git a/security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c
>>> b/security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c
>>> new file mode 100644
>>> index 0000000..257ae69
>>> --- /dev/null
>>> +++ b/security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c
>>> @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
>>> +/*
>>> + * Mount Restriction Security Module
>>> + *
>>> + * Copyright 2011-2013 Google Inc.
>>> + *
>>> + * Authors:
>>> + * Stephan Uphoff <ups@...gle.com>
>>> + * Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>>> + *
>>> + * This software is licensed under the terms of the GNU General Public
>>> + * License version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation, and
>>> + * may be copied, distributed, and modified under those terms.
>>> + *
>>> + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
>>> + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
>>> + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
>>> + * GNU General Public License for more details.
>>> + */
>>> +
>>> +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MntRestrict LSM: " fmt
>>> +
>>> +#include <linux/module.h>
>>> +#include <linux/security.h>
>>> +#include <linux/sched.h>
>>> +#include <linux/fs.h>
>>> +#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
>>> +#include <linux/mount.h>
>>> +#include <linux/path.h>
>>> +#include <linux/root_dev.h>
>>> +
>>> +static int mntrestrict_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
>>> + const char *type, unsigned long flags,
>>> + void *data)
>>> +{
>>> + int error = current->total_link_count ? -ELOOP : 0;
>>> +
>>> + if (error) {
>>> + pr_notice("Mount path with symlinks prohibited -
>>> pid=%d\n",
>>> + task_pid_nr(current));
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + return error;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static struct security_operations mntrestrict_ops = {
>>> + .name = "mntrestrict",
>>> + .sb_mount = mntrestrict_sb_mount,
>>> +};
>>> +
>>> +static int __init mntrestrict_init(void)
>>> +{
>>> + int error;
>>> +
>>> + error = register_security(&mntrestrict_ops);
>>> +
>>> + if (error)
>>> + panic("Could not register MntRestrict security module");
>>> +
>>> + pr_info("symlink destinations will be blocked.\n");
>>> +
>>> + return error;
>>> +}
>>> +security_initcall(mntrestrict_init);
>>> --
>>> 1.7.9.5
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Kees Cook
>>> Chrome OS Security
>>> --
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--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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