Date:	Wed, 06 Nov 2013 19:20:14 +0200
From:	Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
To:	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, zohar@...ibm.com
Cc:	keyrings@...ux-nfs.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/9] encrypted keys & key control op

Hello David,

I will be looking to patches today...

- Dmitry

On 04/11/13 18:22, David Howells wrote:
> Hi Mimi, Dmitry,
>
> Here's a series of patches, the last three of which attempt to fix up a
> problem with encrypted keys update method.  The preceding patches are fixes or
> are preparatory for other changes that I want to put underneath.
>
> I really want to make all key types use ->preparse() to avoid a deadlock in
> the garbage collector with quota recycling, but encrypted_update() requires
> access to the old key - which you can't have in ->preparse() because the
> keyring isn't locked (and this lock is the root of the gc deadlock anyway).
>
> Further, the existence of encrypted_update() means that add_key() will
> sometimes get things wrong with encrypted keys (add_key() will call ->update()
> if a matching key already exists rather than creating a new key).  But you
> can't pre-search for the existence of a key and mould the payload accordingly
> because that means you can race against both add_key() and keyctl_unlink().
>
> My solution is to add a new keyctl function that allows the caller to perform
> a type-specific operation on a key:
>
> 	long keyctl_control(key_serial_t key_id,
> 			    const char *command,
> 			    char *reply_buffer,
> 			    size_t reply_size);
>
> This would then take a NUL-terminated string indicating the command and
> arguments and potentially return a reply up to the buffer length.
>
> For instance:
>
> 	keyctl_control(1234, "encrypted change-master-key fred's key", NULL, 0);
>
> or, from the shell:
>
> 	keyctl control 1234 "encrypted change-master-key fred's key"
>
> (I think that requiring the command string to be prefixed with the expected
> key type is probably a good idea).
>
> The control op could also be used for other things like pushing a key into a
> TPM.
>
> What do you think?
>
> David
> ---
> David Howells (9):
>       KEYS: The RSA public key algorithm needs to select MPILIB
>       KEYS: Provide a generic instantiation function
>       KEYS: struct key_preparsed_payload should have two payload pointers
>       KEYS: Allow expiry time to be set when preparsing a key
>       KEYS: Call ->free_preparse() even after ->preparse() returns an error
>       KEYS: Trusted: Use key preparsing
>       KEYS: Add a keyctl function to alter/control a key in type-dependent way
>       KEYS: Implement keyctl control for encrypted keys
>       KEYS: Fix encrypted key type update method
>
>
>  Documentation/security/keys.txt          |   48 +++++++-
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig           |    1 
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c |   27 ----
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c |    2 
>  include/linux/key-type.h                 |   11 ++
>  include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h              |    1 
>  security/keys/compat.c                   |    6 +
>  security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c |  111 +++++++++++++-----
>  security/keys/internal.h                 |    2 
>  security/keys/key.c                      |   49 +++++++-
>  security/keys/keyctl.c                   |  104 ++++++++++++++++
>  security/keys/trusted.c                  |  190 ++++++++++++++----------------
>  12 files changed, 385 insertions(+), 167 deletions(-)
>
>

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