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Message-ID: <5B8DA87D05A7694D9FA63FD143655C1B1AF073B4@HASMSX106.ger.corp.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2013 12:21:54 +0000
From: "Winkler, Tomas" <tomas.winkler@...el.com>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
CC: "arnd@...db.de" <arnd@...db.de>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [char-misc-next 2/8] mei: hbm: validate client index is not
exceeding allocated array size
> >
> > This somehow should guard buffer overflow allocated of size dev-
> >me_clients_num
> > In theory this can happen only if something go wrong in hardware
> > initialization or there is some other security hole that can change
> > client_num.
>
> What _kind_ of "security hole" could ever change that number? Where
> does it come from? Who can modify it? If you don't know that now then
> we have worse problems...
The allocation of me_clients arrays of mei_clients_num is happening on ME enumeration message,
While the filling out the array is looping over get properties message which is bounded by MEI_CLIENTS_MAX,
so the overflow is indeed possible, of course only on some faulty HW. We had such errors only on new
HW bring ups.
Thanks
Tomas
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