linux-kernel - Re: [REVIEW][PATCH 1/4] vfs: Don't allow overwriting mounts in the current mount namespace

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Message-ID: <87fvr61qtg.fsf@xmission.com>
Date:	Fri, 08 Nov 2013 14:17:31 -0800
From:	ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To:	Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
Cc:	Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
	Linux-Fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Rob Landley <rob@...dley.net>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Matthias Schniedermeyer <ms@...d.de>,
	Linux Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [REVIEW][PATCH 1/4] vfs: Don't allow overwriting mounts in the current mount namespace

Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk> writes:

> On Fri, Nov 08, 2013 at 12:51:52PM -0800, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>
>> The return value of d_mountpoint can be obsolete as soon as it returns
>> as well, so I don't see this as being significantly different.
>
> Not if the ->i_mutex of that sucker is held.  And it *is* held in
> vfs_unlink/vfs_rmdir/vfs_rename.  Note that we only care about a mountpoint
> being falsely assumed to be a non-mountpoint - in the other direction we
> can just shrug and say that we'd won the race and got EBUSY for that.

I wasn't certain of your question.  My point here was that covered() as
a mechanism is as good as d_mountpoint.  So the only potential issue
with covered() as a mechanism is where covered() is called.

Also please note old_dentry->d_inode->i_mutex is not held in rename.

>> In 3.12 vfs_rmdir checks d_mountpoint with the
>> dentry->d_inode->i_mutex and
>> dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_mutex held.
>> 
>> In 3.12 vfs_unlink checks d_mountpoint with the
>> dentry->d_inode->i_mutex and
>> dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_mutex hel.d
>> 
>> In 3.12 vfs_rename_dir and vfs_rename_other checks d_mountpint with the
>> target->i_mutex, new_dir->i_mutex, and old_dir->i_mutex held.
>> 
>> 
>> Therefore the guarantees in 3.12 are:
>> - unlink versus mount races are prevented by the
>>   dentry->d_inode->i_mutex of the dentry being removed.
>> - unlink versus umount races are uninteresting.
>> - mount versus rename races in testing of d_mountpoint are ignored.
>
> Read what you've written a few lines above.  The part about target->i_mutex
> being held.

That works for the rename as unlink case but we don't hold
old_dentry->d_inode->i_mutex which is what is needed to prevent a mount
on the dentry we are renaming.

>> So comparing this to how I have implemented covered the test is at a
>> slightly different location in the call path so there may be a slightly
>> larger race in rename.
>
> You've got a race in unlink.  You've got a race in rename.  You've got a race
> in rmdir.  And none of those had that race in 3.12 (including rename()).

Rename absolutely has a race in 3.12.  With very lucky timing it is
possible to mount something on directory a, simultaneously rename
a to b, and have the mount show up on b.

> BTW, could you describe the races with umount in a bit more details?  Races
> with mount are simple - rmdir() sees that victim isn't a mountpoint and
> proceeds, mount() sees that victim is still alive and proceeds, despite
> the fact that victim is irretrievably on the way to removal.  And that's
> what ->i_mutex on victim prevents, making "check for d_mountpoint / remove /
> call dont_mount()" atomic wrt mount().  What is the problem you are seeing
> with umount()?  rmdir() getting EBUSY because it hasn't noticed umount()
> happening in parallel with it?  Legitimate behaviour, as far I can see...
> Or is it about something different?

I did not say it was a problem only that it was a race.  The only case I
can see is getting a state EBUSY, and I see no problem with a that.

Eric
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