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Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2013 12:11:54 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...ux.intel.com>,
"linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [tip:x86/kaslr] x86, kaslr: Provide randomness functions
On Mon, Nov 11, 2013 at 12:07 PM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> wrote:
>
> * H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com> wrote:
>
>> Of course, perhaps we could just hash struct boot_params as a starting
>> point?
>
> Yeah, that would be a good first step, before trying to parse DMI or ACPI.
> Anything that is reasonably system dependent and gives at least some
> amount of unpredicability.
Given the very limited nature of the early boot environment, what
would you recommend for the hashing routine itself? There's nothing in
boot/ that does any kind of "real" crypto hashing. Should I just XOR
the entire contents of boot_params together?
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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