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Date:	Wed, 13 Nov 2013 11:49:28 -0500
From:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc:	d.kasatkin@...sung.com, zohar@...ibm.com, keyrings@...ux-nfs.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	David Safford <safford@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/9] KEYS: Trusted: Use key preparsing

On Mon, 2013-11-04 at 16:23 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Make use of key preparsing in trusted keys so that quota size determination
> can take place prior to keyring locking when a key is being added.
> 
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>

Cc'ing Dave Safford.

> ---
> 
>  security/keys/trusted.c |  190 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
>  1 file changed, 90 insertions(+), 100 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
> index e13fcf7636f7..ac444e3cfaa7 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
> @@ -859,52 +859,22 @@ static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>  	return ret;
>  }
> 
> -static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
> -{
> -	struct trusted_key_options *options;
> -
> -	options = kzalloc(sizeof *options, GFP_KERNEL);
> -	if (options) {
> -		/* set any non-zero defaults */
> -		options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
> -		options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
> -	}
> -	return options;
> -}
> -
> -static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key)
> -{
> -	struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL;
> -	int ret;
> -
> -	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof *p);
> -	if (ret < 0)
> -		return p;
> -	p = kzalloc(sizeof *p, GFP_KERNEL);
> -	if (p)
> -		p->migratable = 1; /* migratable by default */
> -	return p;
> -}
> -
>  /*
> - * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key
> + * trusted_preparse - Preparse data for an trusted key
>   *
> - * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a
> - * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key,
> - * adding it to the specified keyring.
> + * Decrypt an existing encrypted datablob or create a new encrypted key
> + * based on a kernel random number.

Not sure why the change in terminology from unsealing/trusted blob to
decrypt/encrypted blob.

>   * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
>   */
> -static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
> -			       struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> +static int trusted_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>  {
>  	struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL;
>  	struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
>  	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
>  	char *datablob;
> -	int ret = 0;
> -	int key_cmd;
> -	size_t key_len;
> +	long key_cmd;
> +	int ret = -ENOMEM;
> 
>  	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
>  		return -EINVAL;
> @@ -915,16 +885,20 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
>  	memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
>  	datablob[datalen] = '\0';
> 
> -	options = trusted_options_alloc();
> -	if (!options) {
> -		ret = -ENOMEM;
> +	payload = kzalloc(sizeof(*payload), GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!payload)
>  		goto out;
> -	}
> -	payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
> -	if (!payload) {
> -		ret = -ENOMEM;
> +	prep->payload[0] = payload;
> +
> +	options = kzalloc(sizeof(*options), GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!options)
>  		goto out;
> -	}
> +	prep->type_data[0] = options;
> +
> +	/* set any non-zero defaults */
> +	payload->migratable = 1; /* migratable by default */
> +	options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
> +	options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
> 
>  	key_cmd = datablob_parse(datablob, payload, options);
>  	if (key_cmd < 0) {
> @@ -932,42 +906,81 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
>  		goto out;
>  	}
> 
> +	prep->type_data[1] = (void *)key_cmd;
> +
>  	dump_payload(payload);
>  	dump_options(options);
> +out:
> +	kfree(datablob);
> +	return ret;

trusted_preparse() always fails, since ret is initialized to -ENOMEM and
never set.

Mimi

> +}
> +
> +static void trusted_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> +{
> +	struct trusted_key_payload *p = prep->payload[0];
> +	struct trusted_key_options *o = prep->type_data[0];
> +
> +	if (p) {
> +		memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
> +		kfree(p);
> +	}
> +	kfree(o);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key
> + *
> + * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a
> + * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key,
> + * adding it to the specified keyring.
> + *
> + * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
> + */
> +static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
> +			       struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> +{
> +	struct trusted_key_payload *payload = prep->payload[0];
> +	struct trusted_key_options *options = prep->type_data[0];
> +	long key_cmd = (unsigned long)prep->type_data[1];
> +	int ret;
> +	size_t key_len;
> 
>  	switch (key_cmd) {
>  	case Opt_load:
>  		ret = key_unseal(payload, options);
>  		dump_payload(payload);
>  		dump_options(options);
> -		if (ret < 0)
> +		if (ret < 0) {
>  			pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
> +			return ret;
> +		}
>  		break;
>  	case Opt_new:
>  		key_len = payload->key_len;
>  		ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload->key, key_len);
>  		if (ret != key_len) {
>  			pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
> -			goto out;
> +			return ret;
>  		}
>  		ret = key_seal(payload, options);
> -		if (ret < 0)
> +		if (ret < 0) {
>  			pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
> +			return ret;
> +		}
>  		break;
>  	default:
> -		ret = -EINVAL;
> -		goto out;
> +		return -EINVAL;
>  	}
> -	if (!ret && options->pcrlock)
> +
> +	if (options->pcrlock) {
>  		ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
> -out:
> -	kfree(datablob);
> -	kfree(options);
> -	if (!ret)
> -		rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);
> -	else
> -		kfree(payload);
> -	return ret;
> +		if (ret < 0)
> +			return ret;
> +	}
> +
> +	rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload[0]);
> +	prep->payload[0] = NULL;
> +	return 0;
>  }
> 
>  static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
> @@ -985,39 +998,17 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
>  static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>  {
>  	struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data;
> -	struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;
> -	struct trusted_key_options *new_o;
> -	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
> -	char *datablob;
> +	struct trusted_key_payload *new_p = prep->payload[0];
> +	struct trusted_key_options *new_o = prep->type_data[0];
> +	long key_cmd = (unsigned long)prep->type_data[1];
>  	int ret = 0;
> 
>  	if (!p->migratable)
>  		return -EPERM;
> -	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
> -		return -EINVAL;
> 
> -	datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> -	if (!datablob)
> -		return -ENOMEM;
> -	new_o = trusted_options_alloc();
> -	if (!new_o) {
> -		ret = -ENOMEM;
> -		goto out;
> -	}
> -	new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
> -	if (!new_p) {
> -		ret = -ENOMEM;
> -		goto out;
> -	}
> +	if (key_cmd != Opt_update)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> 
> -	memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
> -	datablob[datalen] = '\0';
> -	ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o);
> -	if (ret != Opt_update) {
> -		ret = -EINVAL;
> -		kfree(new_p);
> -		goto out;
> -	}
>  	/* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */
>  	new_p->migratable = p->migratable;
>  	new_p->key_len = p->key_len;
> @@ -1028,23 +1019,19 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>  	ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o);
>  	if (ret < 0) {
>  		pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
> -		kfree(new_p);
> -		goto out;
> +		return ret;
>  	}
>  	if (new_o->pcrlock) {
>  		ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock);
>  		if (ret < 0) {
>  			pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
> -			kfree(new_p);
> -			goto out;
> +			return ret;
>  		}
>  	}
>  	rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p);
>  	call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
> -out:
> -	kfree(datablob);
> -	kfree(new_o);
> -	return ret;
> +	prep->payload[0] = NULL;
> +	return 0;
>  }
> 
>  /*
> @@ -1093,13 +1080,16 @@ static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
>  }
> 
>  struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
> -	.name = "trusted",
> -	.instantiate = trusted_instantiate,
> -	.update = trusted_update,
> -	.match = user_match,
> -	.destroy = trusted_destroy,
> -	.describe = user_describe,
> -	.read = trusted_read,
> +	.name		= "trusted",
> +	.def_datalen	= sizeof(struct trusted_key_payload),
> +	.preparse	= trusted_preparse,
> +	.free_preparse	= trusted_free_preparse,
> +	.instantiate	= trusted_instantiate,
> +	.update		= trusted_update,
> +	.match		= user_match,
> +	.destroy	= trusted_destroy,
> +	.describe	= user_describe,
> +	.read		= trusted_read,
>  };
> 
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted);
> 
> --
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> 


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