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Message-ID: <52830546.8010002@zytor.com>
Date:	Tue, 12 Nov 2013 20:51:18 -0800
From:	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To:	Greg Price <price@....EDU>
CC:	"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/11] random: code cleanups

On 11/12/2013 08:37 PM, Greg Price wrote:
> 
> I'm thinking only of boot-time blocking.  The idea is that once
> /dev/urandom is seeded with, say, 128 bits of min-entropy in the
> absolute, information-theoretic sense, it can produce an infinite
> supply (or something like 2^128 bits, which amounts to the same thing)
> of bits that can't be distinguished from random, short of breaking or
> brute-forcing the crypto.  So once it's seeded, it's good forever.
> 

And, pray tell, how will you know that you have done that?

Even the best entropy estimation algorithms are nothing but estimations,
and min-entropy is the hardest form of entropy to estimate.

	-hpa

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