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Message-ID: <20131122160837.GJ4046@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2013 11:08:37 -0500
From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
To: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
kexec@...ts.infradead.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@...ah.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] kexec: A new system call to allow in kernel loading
On Fri, Nov 22, 2013 at 05:04:04PM +0100, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Fri, 22 Nov 2013, Eric Paris wrote:
>
> > Consider a cloud provider who gives their customer a machine where
> > they, the cloud provider, is specifying the kernel and initrd. This
> > is a real thing that people do today. Root on the machine has ZERO
> > control over the kernel, bootloader, and initrd. Check it out,
> > qemu/kvm can do this. But, there is no way to disable kexec if the
> > distro configures it in (well, there is in RHEL at least).
>
> If that root can load LKMs, access /dev/mem, or whatever else, there is
> not really a point disabling kexec anyway, is the same thing can be
> implemented (although with more hassle, of course) through these channels
> as well.
I am assuming that in above scenario, kernel will run in locked down
mode (something what matthew implemented for secureboot). Where /dev/mem
write access will be disabled and only signed modules will be loaded.
Thanks
Vivek
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