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Message-ID: <20131126111908.GB2410@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2013 12:19:08 +0100
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@...aro.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Russell King <linux@....linux.org.uk>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@...aro.org>,
Olof Johansson <olofj@...omium.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] use -fstack-protector-strong
* Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@...aro.org> wrote:
> On Mon, 25 Nov 2013, Kees Cook wrote:
>
> > On Mon, Nov 25, 2013 at 3:16 PM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com> wrote:
> > > On 11/25/2013 02:14 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> > >> Build the kernel with -fstack-protector-strong when it is available
> > >> (gcc 4.9 and later). This increases the coverage of the stack protector
> > >> without the heavy performance hit of -fstack-protector-all.
> > >
> > > What is the difference between the various options?
> >
> > -fstack-protector-all:
> > Adds the stack-canary saving prefix and stack-canary checking suffix
> > to _all_ function entry and exit. Results in substantial use of stack
> > space for saving the canary for deep stack users (e.g. historically
> > xfs), and measurable (though shockingly still low) performance hit due
> > to all the saving/checking. Really not suitable for sane systems, and
> > was entirely removed as an option from the kernel many years ago.
> >
> > -fstack-protector:
> > Adds the canary save/check to functions that define an 8
> > (--param=ssp-buffer-size=N, N=8 by default) or more byte local char
> > array. Traditionally, stack overflows happened with string-based
> > manipulations, so this was a way to find those functions. Very few
> > total functions actually get the canary; no measurable performance or
> > size overhead.
> >
> > -fstack-protector-strong
> > Adds the canary for a wider set of functions, since it's not just
> > those with strings that have ultimately been vulnerable to
> > stack-busting. With this superset, more functions end up with a
> > canary, but it still remains small compared to all functions with no
> > measurable change in performance. Based on the original design
> > document, a function gets the canary when it contains any of:
> > - local variable's address used as part of the RHS of an assignment or
> > function argument
> > - local variable is an array (or union containing an array),
> > regardless of array type or length
> > - uses register local variables
> > https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/1xXBH6rRZue4f296vGt9YQcuLVQHeE516stHwt8M9xyU
> >
> > Chrome OS has been using -fstack-protector-strong for its kernel
> > builds for the last 8 months with no problems.
>
> Could you get this information inside the commit log for your patch
> please? This is very valuable info to have right next to the change
> in the repository without having to dig into the gcc manual or
> finding the relevant email thread.
Another piece of information we need for the changelog is a vmlinux
kernel size comparison, with/without the patch, for a defconfig build
(or a Ubuntu distro config build).
Thanks,
Ingo
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