Message-ID: <529FBA71.6070107@hitachi.com>
Date:	Thu, 05 Dec 2013 08:27:45 +0900
From:	Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@...achi.com>
To:	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc:	Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@...ibm.com>,
	Sandeepa Prabhu <sandeepa.prabhu@...aro.org>, x86@...nel.org,
	lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"Steven Rostedt (Red Hat)" <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
	systemtap@...rceware.org, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH -tip v4 0/6] kprobes: introduce NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() and
 fixes crash bugs

(2013/12/04 17:45), Ingo Molnar wrote:
> 
> * Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@...achi.com> wrote:
> 
>> Hi,
>> Here is the version 4 of NOKPORBE_SYMBOL series.
>>
>> In this version, I removed the cleanup patches and
>> add bugfixes I've found, since those bugs will be
>> critical.
>>
>> Rest of the cleanup and visible blacklists will be proposed later in 
>> another series.
> 
> Ok, let me make it clear: we need _both_ the conceptual cleanups and 
> the bug fixes.

I see. Why I split this out is because it includes an RFC patch,
and for easier review. I still have a series of cleanups :)

> Right now kprobes are restricted to root, and they are unsafe and 
> buggy, and rather fundamentally so, because probing cannot be done 
> safely without potentially crashing the kernel. So there's no 
> 'regression' to be fixed, it's mostly about pre-existing bugs - so 
> there's no requirement for them to come before maintainability 
> cleanups.

OK, I think the kprobe is like a strong medicine, not a toy,
since it can intercept most of the kernel functions which
may process a sensitive user private data. Thus even if we
fix all bugs and make it safe, I don't think we can open
it for all users (of course, there should be a knob to open
for any or restricted users.)

> So we need both a maintainable and a sane/safe solution, and I'd like 
> to apply the whole thing at once and be at ease that the solution is 
> round. We should have done this years ago.

For the safeness of kprobes, I have an idea; introduce a whitelist
for dynamic events. AFAICS, the biggest unstable issue of kprobes
comes from putting *many* probes on the functions called from tracers.

It doesn't crash the kernel but slows down so much, because every
probes hit many other nested miss-hit probes. This gives us a big
performance impact. However, on the other side, this kind of feature
can be used *for debugging* static trace events by dynamic one if we
carefully use a small number of probes on such functions. :)

Thus, I think we can restrict users from probing such functions by
using a whitelist which ftrace does already have;
 available_filter_functions :)

Then, I'd like to propose this new whitelist feature in kprobe-tracer
(not raw kprobe itself). And a sysctl knob for disabling the whitelist.
That knob will be /proc/sys/debug/kprobe-event-whitelist and disabling
it will mark kernel tainted so that we can check it from bug reports.

> So could you please send a whole series that I can apply to -tip as a 
> work in progress tree, and then we can see what is left to be solved?

Sure. :) BTW, would I better fold the cleanups for reducing the number of
patches?

Thank you,


-- 
Masami HIRAMATSU
IT Management Research Dept. Linux Technology Center
Hitachi, Ltd., Yokohama Research Laboratory
E-mail: masami.hiramatsu.pt@...achi.com


--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists