lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:	Tue, 10 Dec 2013 12:27:45 -0800
From:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, x86@...nel.org
Subject: [PATCH -next] x86, kaslr: clarify RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET

The help text for RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET was confusing. This has been
clarified, and updated to be an export-only tunable.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig |   29 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index a5c83b9dad45..e5fd1e67fd73 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1752,26 +1752,33 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE
 	   possible. At best, due to page table layouts, 64-bit can use
 	   9 bits of entropy and 32-bit uses 8 bits.
 
+	   If unsure, say N.
+
 config RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET
-	hex "Maximum ASLR offset allowed"
+	hex "Maximum kASLR offset allowed" if EXPERT
 	depends on RANDOMIZE_BASE
 	range 0x0 0x20000000 if X86_32
 	default "0x20000000" if X86_32
 	range 0x0 0x40000000 if X86_64
 	default "0x40000000" if X86_64
 	---help---
-	 Determines the maximal offset in bytes that will be applied to the
-	 kernel when Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is active.
-	 Must be less than or equal to the actual physical memory on the
-	 system. This must be a multiple of CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN.
+	  The lesser of RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET and available physical
+	  memory is used to determine the maximal offset in bytes that will
+	  be applied to the kernel when kernel Address Space Layout
+	  Randomization (kASLR) is active. This must be a multiple of
+	  PHYSICAL_ALIGN.
+
+	  On 32-bit this is limited to 512MiB by page table layouts. The
+	  default is 512MiB.
 
-	 On 32-bit this is limited to 512MiB.
+	  On 64-bit this is limited by how the kernel fixmap page table is
+	  positioned, so this cannot be larger than 1GiB currently. Without
+	  RANDOMIZE_BASE, there is a 512MiB to 1.5GiB split between kernel
+	  and modules. When RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET is above 512MiB, the
+	  modules area will shrink to compensate, up to the current maximum
+	  1GiB to 1GiB split. The default is 1GiB.
 
-	 On 64-bit this is limited by how the kernel fixmap page table is
-	 positioned, so this cannot be larger that 1GiB currently. Normally
-	 there is a 512MiB to 1.5GiB split between kernel and modules. When
-	 this is raised above the 512MiB default, the modules area will
-	 shrink to compensate, up to the current maximum 1GiB to 1GiB split.
+	  If unsure, leave at the default value.
 
 # Relocation on x86 needs some additional build support
 config X86_NEED_RELOCS
-- 
1.7.9.5


-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ