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Message-ID: <20131213132753.GC10981@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Dec 2013 14:27:53 +0100
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...cle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@...il.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@...ll.ch>,
Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection
* Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...cle.com> wrote:
> On 12/12/2013 10:13 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>
> > I like it. I like how lightweight it is, and I like that it can be
> > trivially compiled out. My concerns would be:
> >
> > - how do we avoid bikeshedding about which exploits are "serious
> > enough" to trigger a report?
>
> Well, I've already suggested that only bugs that potentially lead to
> privilege escalation/intrusion (local and remote) would be
> candidates. This probably includes any kind of buffer overflow or
> "wild write" bug.
It's also up to the maintainer of the subsystem, so bikeshedding is
only as effective as the maintainer allows it to be.
> Clearly, a bug should also be present over a complete release cycle
> before it's worth annotating. [...]
Yes, only bugs present in a released kernel are candiates.
> [...] A bug introduced in -rc1 and fixed in -rc5 is NOT a candidate.
That's generally true, except perhaps in the special case if a bug got
backported and released in a stable kernel, and some good exploit got
released for that bug. In that case checking it is useful.
The point is that we want to check things that have a chance to result
in actual messages: i.e. deterministically triggerable bugs in
released kernel that are either trivially exploitable or are known to
be exploited in exploit kits.
Thanks,
Ingo
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