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Message-ID: <20131213155523.GC2609@titan.lakedaemon.net>
Date: Fri, 13 Dec 2013 10:55:23 -0500
From: Jason Cooper <jason@...edaemon.net>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc: Ryan Mallon <rmallon@...il.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>, vegard.nossum@...cle.com,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@...il.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@...ll.ch>,
Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection
On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 02:06:48PM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote:
...
> In future the exploit() code could trigger actual active defensive
> measures, such as immediately freezing all tasks of that UID and
> blocking further fork()s/exec()s of that UID.
>
> Depending on how critical the security of the system is, such active
> measures might still be a preferable outcome even if there's a chance
> of false positives. (Such active measures that freeze the UID will
> also help with forensics, if the attack is indeed real.)
I would recommend adding the CVSS score or some other quantifiable
attribute to the exploit() call, eg:
exploit("CVE-2011-4330", 72);
Or, optionally, maintaining a lut of CVE -> severity number. Then the
user can decide how to respond to different levels of exploits.
So, >80 freezes all tasks of the UID, email user
>30, <80 emails user
<30 just logs it.
I'm swagging this, my point is the user needs a concrete, configurable
way to be alerted / respond.
thx,
Jason.
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