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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLm+oLpqZap9SSsr8cQkQSxVDDs5=q+yvY3X6WxCP80_Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Dec 2013 10:00:45 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>,
Alexander Holler <holler@...oftware.de>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>, "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
vegard.nossum@...cle.com, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@...il.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@...ll.ch>,
Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>,
Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection
On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 5:23 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> wrote:
>
> * Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 11:31:48AM +0100, Alexander Holler wrote:
>> > I've never seen a comment inside the kernel sources which does point
>> > to a CVE, so I assume there already does exists some agreement about
>> > not doing so.
>>
>> We do occasionally put CVE numbers in the commit message, but
>> normally the commit comes first before we ask for a CVE number.
>
> The detection code will most likely come after the fix is applied.
>
> In that case the 'ID' of the message could also be the commit ID of
> the fix in question:
>
> detect_exploit("[exploit for d8af4ce490e9: Fix syscall bug]")
>
> or so - no CVE needed, it's a free form ID that can contain anything
> descriptive about the bug the attacker attempted to exploit.
FWIW, I'd vastly prefer the CVE. The commit rapidly becomes
meaningless as things go into -stable, or manual backports. The CVE is
intended to be the single unique descriptor of a security problem.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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