linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] ipc: introduce ipc_valid_object() helper to sort out IPC

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Date:	Wed, 18 Dec 2013 10:51:00 -0200
From:	Rafael Aquini <aquini@...hat.com>
To:	Manfred Spraul <manfred@...orfullife.com>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@...com>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
	Greg Thelen <gthelen@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] ipc: introduce ipc_valid_object() helper to sort out
 IPC_RMID races

On Wed, Dec 18, 2013 at 01:11:29PM +0100, Manfred Spraul wrote:
> On 12/18/2013 12:28 AM, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> >After the locking semantics for the SysV IPC API got improved, a couple of
> >IPC_RMID race windows were opened because we ended up dropping the
> >'kern_ipc_perm.deleted' check performed way down in ipc_lock().
> >The spotted races got sorted out by re-introducing the old test within
> >the racy critical sections.
> >
> >This patch introduces ipc_valid_object() to consolidate the way we cope with
> >IPC_RMID races by using the same abstraction across the API implementation.
> >
> >Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <aquini@...hat.com>
> >Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>
> >Acked-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@...gle.com>
> >---
> >Changelog:
> >* v2:
> >  - drop assert_spin_locked() from ipc_valid_object() for less overhead
> a) sysv ipc is lockless whereever possible, without writing to any
> shared cachelines.
> Therefore my first reaction was: No, please leave the assert in. It
> will help us to catch bugs.
> 
> b) then I noticed: the assert would be a bug, the comment in front
> of ipc_valid_object() that the caller must hold _perm.lock is wrong:
> >@@ -1846,7 +1846,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(semtimedop, int, semid, struct sembuf __user *, tsops,
> >  	error = -EIDRM;
> >  	locknum = sem_lock(sma, sops, nsops);
> >-	if (sma->sem_perm.deleted)
> >+	if (!ipc_valid_object(&sma->sem_perm))
> >  		goto out_unlock_free;
> simple semtimedop() operation do not acquire sem_perm.lock, they
> only acquire the per-semaphore lock and check that sem_perm.lock is
> not held. This is sufficient to prevent races with RMID.
> 
> Could you update the comment?

The comment for ipc_valid_object() is not entirely wrong, as holding the spinlock 
is clearly necessary for all cases except for this one you pointed above. 
When I dropped the assert as Davilohr suggested, I then could have this one exception 
case (where the check can, eventually, be done lockless) converted too, but I did not include 
an exception comment at that particular checkpoint. Perhaps, that's what I should have done, or
perhaps the best thing is to just let all that as is sits right now.


> [...]
> >@@ -1116,7 +1116,7 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg, ulong *raddr,
> >  	ipc_lock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
> >  	/* check if shm_destroy() is tearing down shp */
> >-	if (shp->shm_file == NULL) {
> >+	if (!ipc_valid_object(&shp->shm_perm)) {
> >  		ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
> >  		err = -EIDRM;
> >  		goto out_unlock;
> Please mention the change from "shm_file == NULL" to perm.deleted in
> the changelog.
> With regards to the impact of this change: No idea, I've never
> worked on the shm code.

This change is, essentially, the proper way to cope with such races. Please
refer to the following reply on this same trhead, for further info:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/12/17/704

Thanks!
-- Rafael

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