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Message-ID: <1387799130.28735.27.camel@dhcp-9-2-203-236.watson.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Dec 2013 06:45:30 -0500
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
jmorris@...ei.org, dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] ima: hooks for directory integrity protection
On Mon, 2013-12-23 at 10:54 +0200, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 12/12/13 15:39, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Mon, 2013-11-18 at 22:24 +0200, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> >> Both IMA-appraisal and EVM protect the integrity of regular files.
> >> IMA protects file data integrity, while EVM protects the file meta-data
> >> integrity, such as file attributes and extended attributes. This patch
> >> set adds hooks for offline directory integrity protection.
> >>
> >> An inode itself does not have any file name associated with it. The
> >> association of the file name to inode is done via directory entries.
> >> On a running system, mandatory and/or discretionary access control prevent
> >> unprivileged file deletion, file name change, or hardlink creation.
> >> In an offline attack, without these protections, the association between
> >> a file name and an inode is unprotected. Files can be deleted, renamed
> >> or moved from one directory to another one. In all of these cases,
> >> the integrity of the file data and metadata is good.
> >>
> >> To prevent such attacks, it is necessary to protect integrity of directory
> >> content.
> > Thanks Dmitry for re-posting these 'directory integrity protection'
> > patches.
> > The patches have evolved nicely. Perhaps not a formal changelog, but a
> > short
> > summary of the major changes, would have been nice.
>
> Will do in re-post...
>
> >> This patch adds 2 new hooks for directory integrity protection:
> >> ima_dir_check() and ima_dir_update().
> > Although these patches are probably bisect safe, as they rely on
> > Kconfig, the normal ordering of patches is to define a function and use
> > it in the same patch. In the case, like here, where a new function/hook
> > is defined in one subsystem, but called from another, we can split them,
> > but the normal convention is to add the new function/hook first in one
> > patch, and then use it in a subsequent patch.
>
> Sorry, I did not get...
>
> >> "normal convention is to add the new function/hook first in one
> patch, and then use it in a subsequent patch. "
>
> This is what patches do. Add hook in one patch and use in an other..
Yes, define the hook/function, before using it.
thanks,
Mimi
>
> Do you mean to swap the order of these 2 patches??
> >
> >> ima_dir_check() is called to verify integrity of the the directory during
> >> the initial path lookup.
> >>
> >> ima_dir_update() is called from several places in namei.c, when the directory
> >> content is changing, for updating the directory hash.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
> >> ---
> >> fs/namei.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> >> fs/open.c | 6 ++++++
> >> include/linux/ima.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++
> >> net/unix/af_unix.c | 2 ++
> >> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 3 +++
> >> 5 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> >> index 645268f..d0e1821 100644
> >> --- a/fs/namei.c
> >> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> >> @@ -1469,16 +1469,33 @@ static int lookup_slow(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path)
> >> return 0;
> >> }
> >>
> >> +static inline int may_lookup_ima(struct nameidata *nd, int err)
> >> +{
> >> + if (err)
> >> + return err;
> >> + err = ima_dir_check(&nd->path, MAY_EXEC|MAY_NOT_BLOCK);
> >> + if (err != -ECHILD)
> >> + return err;
> > A short comment here, why -ECHILD is special, would be good.
>
> This is the same as for inode_permission().
> If calling code requires locking, we have to interrupt RCU path walk and
> re-start with ref path walk...
>
> >> + if (unlazy_walk(nd, NULL))
> >> + return -ECHILD;
> >> + return ima_dir_check(&nd->path, MAY_EXEC);
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> static inline int may_lookup(struct nameidata *nd)
> >> {
> >> + int err = 0;
> >> +
> >> if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
> >> - int err = inode_permission(nd->inode, MAY_EXEC|MAY_NOT_BLOCK);
> >> + err = inode_permission(nd->inode, MAY_EXEC|MAY_NOT_BLOCK);
> >> if (err != -ECHILD)
> >> - return err;
> >> + return may_lookup_ima(nd, err);
> >> if (unlazy_walk(nd, NULL))
> >> return -ECHILD;
> >> }
> >> - return inode_permission(nd->inode, MAY_EXEC);
> >> + err = inode_permission(nd->inode, MAY_EXEC);
> >> + if (err)
> >> + return err;
> >> + return ima_dir_check(&nd->path, MAY_EXEC);
> >> }
> >>
> >> static inline int handle_dots(struct nameidata *nd, int type)
> >> @@ -2956,6 +2973,8 @@ retry_lookup:
> >> }
> >> mutex_lock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
> >> error = lookup_open(nd, path, file, op, got_write, opened);
> >> + if (error >= 0 && (*opened & FILE_CREATED))
> >> + ima_dir_update(&nd->path, NULL);
> >> mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
> >>
> >> if (error <= 0) {
> >> @@ -3454,6 +3473,8 @@ retry:
> >> error = vfs_mknod(path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,0);
> >> break;
> >> }
> >> + if (!error)
> >> + ima_dir_update(&path, dentry);
> >> out:
> >> done_path_create(&path, dentry);
> >> if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
> >> @@ -3510,6 +3531,8 @@ retry:
> >> error = security_path_mkdir(&path, dentry, mode);
> >> if (!error)
> >> error = vfs_mkdir(path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode);
> >> + if (!error)
> >> + ima_dir_update(&path, dentry);
> >> done_path_create(&path, dentry);
> >> if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
> >> lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
> >> @@ -3626,6 +3649,8 @@ retry:
> >> if (error)
> >> goto exit3;
> >> error = vfs_rmdir(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
> >> + if (!error)
> >> + ima_dir_update(&nd.path, NULL);
> >> exit3:
> >> dput(dentry);
> >> exit2:
> >> @@ -3721,6 +3746,8 @@ retry:
> >> if (error)
> >> goto exit2;
> >> error = vfs_unlink(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
> >> + if (!error)
> >> + ima_dir_update(&nd.path, NULL);
> >> exit2:
> >> dput(dentry);
> >> }
> >> @@ -3801,6 +3828,8 @@ retry:
> >> error = security_path_symlink(&path, dentry, from->name);
> >> if (!error)
> >> error = vfs_symlink(path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from->name);
> >> + if (!error)
> >> + ima_dir_update(&path, dentry);
> >> done_path_create(&path, dentry);
> >> if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
> >> lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
> >> @@ -3919,6 +3948,8 @@ retry:
> >> if (error)
> >> goto out_dput;
> >> error = vfs_link(old_path.dentry, new_path.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry);
> >> + if (!error)
> >> + ima_dir_update(&new_path, NULL);
> >> out_dput:
> >> done_path_create(&new_path, new_dentry);
> >> if (retry_estale(error, how)) {
> >> @@ -4171,6 +4202,11 @@ retry:
> >> goto exit5;
> >> error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry,
> >> new_dir->d_inode, new_dentry);
> >> + if (!error) {
> >> + ima_dir_update(&oldnd.path, NULL);
> >> + if (!path_equal(&oldnd.path, &newnd.path))
> >> + ima_dir_update(&newnd.path, NULL);
> >> + }
> >> exit5:
> >> dput(new_dentry);
> >> exit4:
> >> diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
> >> index d420331..021e2c5 100644
> >> --- a/fs/open.c
> >> +++ b/fs/open.c
> >> @@ -390,6 +390,9 @@ retry:
> >> error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
> >> if (error)
> >> goto dput_and_out;
> >> + error = ima_dir_check(&path, MAY_EXEC);
> >> + if (error)
> >> + goto dput_and_out;
> >>
> >> set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &path);
> >>
> >> @@ -420,6 +423,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(fchdir, unsigned int, fd)
> >> goto out_putf;
> >>
> >> error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
> >> + if (error)
> >> + goto out_putf;
> >> + error = ima_dir_check(&f.file->f_path, MAY_EXEC);
> >> if (!error)
> >> set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &f.file->f_path);
> >> out_putf:
> >> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> >> index 1b7f268..e33035e 100644
> >> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> >> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> >> @@ -73,4 +73,27 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> >> return 0;
> >> }
> >> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
> >> +
> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_DIRECTORIES
> >> +extern int ima_dir_check(struct path *dir, int mask);
> >> +extern int ima_special_check(struct file *file, int mask);
> > No mention was made of this new hook. This should be a separate patch,
> > with its own patch description.
>
> Yes. This is a patch split mistake.. Thanks.
>
> >
> > thanks,
> >
> > Mimi
> >
> >> +extern void ima_dir_update(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
> >> +#else
> >> +static inline int ima_dir_check(struct path *dir, int mask)
> >> +{
> >> + return 0;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +static inline int ima_special_check(struct file *file, int mask)
> >> +{
> >> + return 0;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +static inline void ima_dir_update(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
> >> +{
> >> + return;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_DIRECTORIES */
> >> +
> >> #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
> >> diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> >> index 86de99a..6230a50 100644
> >> --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
> >> +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> >> @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@
> >> #include <net/checksum.h>
> >> #include <linux/security.h>
> >> #include <linux/freezer.h>
> >> +#include <linux/ima.h>
> >>
> >> struct hlist_head unix_socket_table[2 * UNIX_HASH_SIZE];
> >> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unix_socket_table);
> >> @@ -841,6 +842,7 @@ static int unix_mknod(const char *sun_path, umode_t mode, struct path *res)
> >> if (!err) {
> >> res->mnt = mntget(path.mnt);
> >> res->dentry = dget(dentry);
> >> + ima_dir_update(&path, dentry);
> >> }
> >> }
> >> done_path_create(&path, dentry);
> >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> >> index 6c12811..18d76d8 100644
> >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> >> @@ -300,6 +300,9 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> >> */
> >> int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
> >> {
> >> + if (!S_ISREG(file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
> >> + return ima_special_check(file, mask);
> >> +
> >> ima_rdwr_violation_check(file);
> >> return process_measurement(file, NULL,
> >> mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
> >
> >
>
> Thanks
>
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