linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] iommu/intel: SNP bit is not dependent on iommu domain coherency

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Message-ID: <1387821199.30327.107.camel@bling.home>
Date:	Mon, 23 Dec 2013 10:53:19 -0700
From:	Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>
To:	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
	iommu <iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] iommu/intel: SNP bit is not dependent on iommu domain
 coherency

David,

Any comments on this patch?  Thanks,

Alex

On Tue, 2013-10-29 at 10:21 -0600, Alex Williamson wrote:
> The setting of the SNP bit in the intel-iommu page tables should not
> be dependent on the current capability of the iommu domain.  The
> current VT-d spec (2.2) indicates the SNP bit is "treated as
> reserved[0] by hardware implementations not supporting Snoop Control".
> Furthermore, section 3.7.3 indicates:
> 
>   If the Snoop Control (SC) field in extended capability Register is
>   reported as 0, snoop behavior for access to the page mapped through
>   second-level translation is determined by the no-snoop attribute in
>   the request.
> 
> This all seems to indicate that hardware incapable of Snoop Control
> will handle the SNP bit as zero regardless of the value stored in
> the PTE.
> 
> The trouble with the current implementation is that mapping flags
> depend on the state of the iommu domain at the time of the mapping,
> yet no attempt is made to update existing mappings when the iommu
> domain composition changes.  This leaves the iommu domain in a state
> where some mappings may enforce coherency, others do not, and the user
> of the IOMMU API has no ability to later enable the desired flags
> atomically with respect to DMA.
> 
> If we always honor the IOMMU_CACHE flag then an IOMMU API user who
> specifies IOMMU_CACHE for all mappings can assume that the coherency
> of the mappings within a domain follow the coherency capability of
> the domain itself.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>
> ---
>  drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c |    2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
> index 15e9b57..c46c6a6 100644
> --- a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
> +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
> @@ -4084,7 +4084,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_map(struct iommu_domain *domain,
>  		prot |= DMA_PTE_READ;
>  	if (iommu_prot & IOMMU_WRITE)
>  		prot |= DMA_PTE_WRITE;
> -	if ((iommu_prot & IOMMU_CACHE) && dmar_domain->iommu_snooping)
> +	if (iommu_prot & IOMMU_CACHE)
>  		prot |= DMA_PTE_SNP;
>  
>  	max_addr = iova + size;
> 


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