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Message-ID: <20140102203320.GA27615@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2014 12:33:20 -0800
From: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: cl@...ux-foundation.org, penberg@...nel.org, mpm@...enic.com
Subject: Memory allocator semantics
Hello!
>From what I can see, the Linux-kernel's SLAB, SLOB, and SLUB memory
allocators would deal with the following sort of race:
A. CPU 0: r1 = kmalloc(...); ACCESS_ONCE(gp) = r1;
CPU 1: r2 = ACCESS_ONCE(gp); if (r2) kfree(r2);
However, my guess is that this should be considered an accident of the
current implementation rather than a feature. The reason for this is
that I cannot see how you would usefully do (A) above without also allowing
(B) and (C) below, both of which look to me to be quite destructive:
B. CPU 0: r1 = kmalloc(...); ACCESS_ONCE(shared_x) = r1;
CPU 1: r2 = ACCESS_ONCE(shared_x); if (r2) kfree(r2);
CPU 2: r3 = ACCESS_ONCE(shared_x); if (r3) kfree(r3);
This results in the memory being on two different freelists.
C. CPU 0: r1 = kmalloc(...); ACCESS_ONCE(shared_x) = r1;
CPU 1: r2 = ACCESS_ONCE(shared_x); r2->a = 1; r2->b = 2;
CPU 2: r3 = ACCESS_ONCE(shared_x); if (r3) kfree(r3);
CPU 3: r4 = kmalloc(...); r4->s = 3; r4->t = 4;
This results in the memory being used by two different CPUs,
each of which believe that they have sole access.
But I thought I should ask the experts.
So, am I correct that kernel hackers are required to avoid "drive-by"
kfree()s of kmalloc()ed memory?
Thanx, Paul
PS. To the question "Why would anyone care about (A)?", then answer
is "Inquiring programming-language memory-model designers want
to know."
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