lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <25561389383560@web15m.yandex.ru>
Date:	Fri, 10 Jan 2014 21:52:40 +0200
From:	Victor Porton <porton@...od.ru>
To:	Joshua Brindle <brindle@...rksecurity.com>
Cc:	"selinux@...ho.nsa.gov" <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Create new NetFilter table



10.01.2014, 21:39, "Joshua Brindle" <brindle@...rksecurity.com>:
> Victor Porton wrote:
>
>>  I propose to create a new NetFilter table dedicated to rules created programmatically (not by explicit admin's iptables command).
>>
>>  Otherwise an admin could be tempted to say `iptables -F security` which would probably break rules created for example by sandboxing software (which may follow same-origin policy to restrict one particular program to certain domain and port only). Note that in this case `iptables -F security` is a security risk (sandbox breaking)?
>>
>>  New table could be possibly be called:
>>
>>  - temp
>>  - temporary
>>  - auto
>>  - automatic
>>  - volatile
>>  - daemon
>>  - system
>>  - sys
>>
>>  In iptables docs it should be said that this table should not be manipulated manually.
>
> Is it possible that the solution to your sandboxing problem is seccomp
> filter?
>
> http://outflux.net/teach-seccomp/
>
> You'd filter out any syscall that can make outbound connections and then
> only pass already opened sockets to the sandboxed threads?
>
> seccomp filter was actually created for sandboxing, so that user
> applications could voluntarily shed the ability to call certain syscalls
> before handling untrusted data.

seccomp would not work for me, because I need network enabled sandboxes. Moreover we should be able to filter out certain subnets such as 127.0.0.0/255.0.0.0 (and others), This cleanly can't be done with seccomp.

-- 
Victor Porton - http://portonvictor.org
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ