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Message-Id: <25561389383560@web15m.yandex.ru>
Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2014 21:52:40 +0200
From: Victor Porton <porton@...od.ru>
To: Joshua Brindle <brindle@...rksecurity.com>
Cc: "selinux@...ho.nsa.gov" <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Create new NetFilter table
10.01.2014, 21:39, "Joshua Brindle" <brindle@...rksecurity.com>:
> Victor Porton wrote:
>
>> I propose to create a new NetFilter table dedicated to rules created programmatically (not by explicit admin's iptables command).
>>
>> Otherwise an admin could be tempted to say `iptables -F security` which would probably break rules created for example by sandboxing software (which may follow same-origin policy to restrict one particular program to certain domain and port only). Note that in this case `iptables -F security` is a security risk (sandbox breaking)?
>>
>> New table could be possibly be called:
>>
>> - temp
>> - temporary
>> - auto
>> - automatic
>> - volatile
>> - daemon
>> - system
>> - sys
>>
>> In iptables docs it should be said that this table should not be manipulated manually.
>
> Is it possible that the solution to your sandboxing problem is seccomp
> filter?
>
> http://outflux.net/teach-seccomp/
>
> You'd filter out any syscall that can make outbound connections and then
> only pass already opened sockets to the sandboxed threads?
>
> seccomp filter was actually created for sandboxing, so that user
> applications could voluntarily shed the ability to call certain syscalls
> before handling untrusted data.
seccomp would not work for me, because I need network enabled sandboxes. Moreover we should be able to filter out certain subnets such as 127.0.0.0/255.0.0.0 (and others), This cleanly can't be done with seccomp.
--
Victor Porton - http://portonvictor.org
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