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Message-ID: <1389632933.16290.15.camel@tucsk.piliscsaba.szeredi.hu>
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2014 18:08:53 +0100
From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...e.cz>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: miklos@...redi.hu, viro@...IV.linux.org.uk,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, hch@...radead.org,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, dhowells@...hat.com, zab@...hat.com,
jack@...e.cz, luto@...capital.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/11] cross rename v3
On Mon, 2014-01-13 at 21:46 +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> > Please consider for -next (3.14).
>
> Excuse me, but did you explain to CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH=y users?
No, sorry.
> I don't see changes in TOMOYO and AppArmor directories.
> TOMOYO might want to use new keyword like "file swapname"
> rather than using "file rename" for cross rename operation.
Cross rename (A, B) is equivalent to plain rename(A, B) + plain rename
(B, A) done as a single atomic operation. If security module allows
both then cross rename is allowed. If at least one is denied then the
cross rename is denied.
This is prepared for in "[PATCH 06/11] security: add flags to rename
hooks" and actually done in "[PATCH 07/11] vfs: add cross-rename".
Security people are free to implement a explicit security check for
cross rename, but I don't think that is in the scope of this patchset.
Thanks,
Miklos
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