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Message-ID: <1389640982.5567.442.camel@haakon3.risingtidesystems.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2014 11:23:02 -0800
From: "Nicholas A. Bellinger" <nab@...ux-iscsi.org>
To: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@....mellanox.co.il>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@...lanox.com>,
"Nicholas A. Bellinger" <nab@...erainc.com>,
target-devel <target-devel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-scsi <linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@...cle.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>, Hannes Reinecke <hare@...e.de>,
Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@...lanox.com>,
oren Duer <oren@...lanox.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/14] target/sbc: Add sbc_check_prot + update
sbc_parse_cdb for DIF
On Sun, 2014-01-12 at 13:59 +0200, Sagi Grimberg wrote:
> On 1/10/2014 9:04 AM, Nicholas A. Bellinger wrote:
> > On Thu, 2014-01-09 at 16:58 +0200, Sagi Grimberg wrote:
> >> On 1/8/2014 10:36 PM, Nicholas A. Bellinger wrote:
<SNIP>
> >>> diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_sbc.c b/drivers/target/target_core_sbc.c
> >>> index 52ae54e..600ffcb 100644
> >>> --- a/drivers/target/target_core_sbc.c
> >>> +++ b/drivers/target/target_core_sbc.c
> >>> @@ -563,6 +563,27 @@ sbc_compare_and_write(struct se_cmd *cmd)
> >>> return TCM_NO_SENSE;
> >>> }
> >>>
> >>> +bool
> >>> +sbc_check_prot(struct se_device *dev, struct se_cmd *cmd, unsigned char *cdb)
> >>> +{
> >>> + if (!dev->dev_attrib.pi_prot_type)
> >>> + return true;
> >>> +
> >>> + if (dev->dev_attrib.pi_prot_type == TARGET_DIF_TYPE2_PROT &&
> >>> + (cdb[1] & 0xe0))
> >>> + return false;
> >>> +
> >>> + if (!(cdb[1] & 0xe0)) {
> >>> + pr_warn("Target: Unprotected READ/WRITE to DIF device\n");
> >>> + return true;
> >>> + }
> >>> + if (!cmd->t_prot_sg || !cmd->t_prot_nents)
> >>> + return true;
> >>> +
> >>> + cmd->se_cmd_flags |= SCF_PROT;
> >> Isn't this the place to fill the se_cmd DIF execution parameters?
> >> prot_op, prot_type, guard_type, initial_reftag, apptag etc...
> >> Next, all parties interested in DIF execution should look in se_cmd
> >> (backstore, transport).
> > Yes, working on this for -v2 as well. :)
>
> OK, so just to be clear, both the transport and the backstore will be
> look in se_cmd protection attributes when executing IO correct?
>
Correct.
--nab
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