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Message-ID: <87bnzdx2qn.fsf@rustcorp.com.au>
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 15:26:00 +1030
From: Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>
To: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@...ba.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: powerpc: possible access beyond TASK_SIZE in start_thread
Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com> writes:
> Hi Rusty,
>
> I was looking at the diff between kernel v3.12 and recent master (after 3.13-rc7),
> and noticed that in the following commit:
Cool!
I just moved the code, so any problem exists before this, too.
> commit 94af3abf995b17f6a008b00152c94841242ec6c7
> Author: Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>
> Date: Wed Nov 20 22:15:02 2013 +1100
>
> powerpc: ELF2 binaries launched directly.
>
> on powerpc, those lines appear in start_thread():
>
> + /* start is a relocated pointer to the function
> + * descriptor for the elf _start routine. The first
> + * entry in the function descriptor is the entry
> + * address of _start and the second entry is the TOC
> + * value we need to use.
> + */
> + __get_user(entry, (unsigned long __user *)start);
> + __get_user(toc, (unsigned long __user *)start+1);
>
> Note the "__" before get_user(), which bypass any kind of validation on the
> addresses.
>
> Amongst the callers, if we look at fs/binfmt_elf.c:load_elf_binary(), we see:
>
> elf_entry = loc->elf_ex.e_entry;
> if (BAD_ADDR(elf_entry)) {
> force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
> retval = -EINVAL;
> goto out_free_dentry;
> }
>
> and the elf_entry gets passed to start_thread().
>
> If we craft a binary with elf_entry address of
>
> TASK_SIZE - 1 (1 byte before TASK_SIZE), then I think we could make both
> __get_user() calls access data beyond TASK_SIZE, because elf_entry address
> is verified, but there is no validation on its range AFAIU. Is it expected ?
> Am I missing something ?
Yes, looks like we can read the first 15 bytes of kernel space. That's
not likely to be interesting, but we should probably check anyway.
Thanks!
Rusty.
===
Subject: powerpc: don't allow entry point to be read from kernel.
Mathieu points out that while start is checked, it could be TASK_SIZE-1,
which means this code could read the first 15 bytes of kernel space.
That's text for now, but let's be paranoid.
start_thread() doesn't have a return value, so easiest to use get_user:
you'll get a jump to zero if it fails.
Reported-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
index 4a96556fd2d4..b4ca298a5536 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
@@ -1113,8 +1113,8 @@ void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long start, unsigned long sp)
* address of _start and the second entry is the TOC
* value we need to use.
*/
- __get_user(entry, (unsigned long __user *)start);
- __get_user(toc, (unsigned long __user *)start+1);
+ get_user(entry, (unsigned long __user *)start);
+ get_user(toc, (unsigned long __user *)start+1);
/* Check whether the e_entry function descriptor entries
* need to be relocated before we can use them.
--
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