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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJ7FFpjAkuMjXLXFd5P=FewfHDSReVsZGhYgPVuYMyzBw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2014 21:18:37 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Cong Ding <dinggnu@...il.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...ux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>,
Michael Davidson <md@...gle.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@...ndmicro.com.cn>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] x86/kaslr for v3.14
On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 2:54 PM, Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> So I pulled this, but one question:
>
> On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 8:47 AM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com> wrote:
>> +config RANDOMIZE_BASE
>> + bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image"
>> + depends on RELOCATABLE
>> + depends on !HIBERNATION
>
> How fundamental is that "!HIBERNATION" issue? Right now that
> anti-dependency on hibernation support will mean that no distro kernel
> will actually use the kernel address space randomization. Which
> long-term is a problem.
>
> I'm not sure HIBERNATION is really getting all that much use, but I
> suspect distros would still want to support it.
>
> Is it just a temporary "I wasn't able to make it work, need to get
> some PM people involved", or is it something really fundamental?
Right, this is a "need to get PM people involved" situation. When
kASLR was being designed, hibernation learning about the kernel base
looked like a separable problem, and given the very long list of
requirements for making it work at all, I carved this out as "future
work".
As for perf, it's similar -- it's another entirely solvable problem,
but perf needs to be untaught some of its assumptions.
We've had a static kernel base forever, so I'm expecting some bumps in
the road here. I'm hopeful none of it will be too painful, though.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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