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Message-ID: <20140126151422.GA5386@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 26 Jan 2014 16:14:22 +0100
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To: "Ren, Qiaowei" <qiaowei.ren@...el.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/4] x86, mpx: add prctl commands PR_MPX_INIT,
PR_MPX_RELEASE
* Ren, Qiaowei <qiaowei.ren@...el.com> wrote:
> The size of one bound table is 4M bytes for 64bit, and 16K bytes for
> 32bit. It can not be accessed by user-space, and it will be accessed
> automatically by hardware.
So, here's the bound-table allocation AFAICS:
+static bool allocate_bt(unsigned long bd_entry)
+{
+ unsigned long bt_size = 1UL << (MPX_L2_BITS+MPX_L2_SHIFT);
+ unsigned long bt_addr, old_val = 0;
+
+ bt_addr = sys_mmap_pgoff(0, bt_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_POPULATE, -1, 0);
What ensures that user-space cannot access (and in particular, modify)
the pages at bt_addr? It's a read-write anonymous mapping AFAICS.
Thanks,
Ingo
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