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Message-ID: <52E60BFD.7030305@nod.at>
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2014 08:34:21 +0100
From: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...ux.intel.com>
CC: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Cong Ding <dinggnu@...il.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>,
Michael Davidson <md@...gle.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@...ndmicro.com.cn>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] x86/kaslr for v3.14
Am 27.01.2014 07:52, schrieb H. Peter Anvin:
> Of course, stack traces themselves contain that information, so one
> could argue that oops=panic is required in order for kASLR to provide
> any kind of security against root. (oops=panic is probably a good idea
> in secure environments anyway...)
Now I understand your point.
/proc/<pid>/stack and a world-readable /boot also need to be disabled.
Deploying a secure kASLR is not easy, especially for end-user distros.
Maybe a CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_I_MEAN_IT which disables various sources of
information leakage would help too. ;-)
Thanks,
//richard
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