linux-kernel - Re: [GIT PULL] x86/kaslr for v3.14

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Date:	Mon, 27 Jan 2014 08:34:21 +0100
From:	Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
To:	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...ux.intel.com>
CC:	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Cong Ding <dinggnu@...il.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>,
	Michael Davidson <md@...gle.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@...ndmicro.com.cn>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] x86/kaslr for v3.14

Am 27.01.2014 07:52, schrieb H. Peter Anvin:
> Of course, stack traces themselves contain that information, so one
> could argue that oops=panic is required in order for kASLR to provide
> any kind of security against root.  (oops=panic is probably a good idea
> in secure environments anyway...)

Now I understand your point.

/proc/<pid>/stack and a world-readable /boot also need to be disabled.
Deploying a secure kASLR is not easy, especially for end-user distros.

Maybe a CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_I_MEAN_IT which disables various sources of
information leakage would help too. ;-)

Thanks,
//richard
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