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Message-ID: <52E601DA.7010605@zytor.com>
Date: Sun, 26 Jan 2014 22:51:06 -0800
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@...il.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...ux.intel.com>
CC: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Cong Ding <dinggnu@...il.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>,
Michael Davidson <md@...gle.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@...ndmicro.com.cn>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] x86/kaslr for v3.14
On 01/26/2014 10:49 PM, Richard Weinberger wrote:
>>
>> No, because that information is available to user space unless we panic.
>
> Didn't you mean non-root?
> I thought one has to set dmesg_restrict anyways if kASLR is used.
>
> And isn't the offset available to perf too?
> Of course only for root, but still user space.
>
For certain system security levels one want to protect even from a rogue
root. In those cases, leaking that information via dmesg and perf isn't
going to work, either.
With lower security settings, by all means...
-hpa
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