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Message-ID: <20140203223127.GE10323@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Date: Mon, 3 Feb 2014 22:31:27 +0000
From: Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@...tank.com>,
Sage Weil <sage@...tank.com>, Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
ceph-devel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
Guangliang Zhao <lucienchao@...il.com>,
Li Wang <li.wang@...ntykylin.com>, zheng.z.yan@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] ceph: fix posix ACL hooks
On Mon, Feb 03, 2014 at 01:44:22PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 3, 2014 at 1:39 PM, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
> >
> > If we really have hardlinks, the result of permission check would better
> > be a function of inode itself - as in, "if it gives different results
> > for two pathnames reachable for the same user, we have a bug".
^^^^^^^^^
> No. You're wrong.
>
> EVEN ON A UNIX FILESYSTEM THE PATH IS MEANINGFUL.
>
> Do this: create a hardlink in two different directories. Make the
> *directory* permissions for one of the directories be something you
> cannot traverse. Now try to check the permissions of the *same* inode
> through those two paths. Notice how you get *different* results.
>
> Really.
Yes. In one case we won't get to looking at the permissions of that thing
at all.
> Now, imagine that you are doing the same thing over a network. On the
> server, there may be a single inode for the file, but when the client
> gives the server a pathname, the two pathnames to that single inode
> ARE NOT EQUIVALENT.
Why do we pretend that those are links, in the first place?
> And the fact is, filesystems with hardlinks and path-name-based
> operations do exist. cifs with the unix extensions is one of them.
Pox on Tridge...
I really, really hate that change; I can buy "->getxattr() has inconvenient
interface because of lousy protocol design", but spreading the same to
->permission(), with everything that will fall out of that... <shudder>
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