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Message-Id: <20140218151650.02fb2d6034deb2d3d11ccc7a@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2014 15:16:50 -0800
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Fabian Frederick <fabf@...net.be>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] fs: xattr: Don't display attributes without read
access
On Sun, 16 Feb 2014 20:31:01 +0800 Fabian Frederick <fabf@...net.be> wrote:
> Any user can display extented attribute names without read
> access.
>
> eg: attr -l <filename>
>
> This patch checks inode_permission in listxattr common
> function before executing vfs_listxattr.
>
> ...
>
> --- a/fs/xattr.c
> +++ b/fs/xattr.c
> @@ -543,6 +543,10 @@ listxattr(struct dentry *d, char __user *list, size_t size)
> char *klist = NULL;
> char *vlist = NULL; /* If non-NULL, we used vmalloc() */
>
> + error = inode_permission(d->d_inode, MAY_READ);
> + if (error)
> + return error;
> +
> if (size) {
> if (size > XATTR_LIST_MAX)
> size = XATTR_LIST_MAX;
erk. Doesn't this mean that if existing userspace is relying on the
current behaviour, this patch will cause breakage?
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