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Message-Id: <1393445473-15068-6-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 15:11:06 -0500
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: keescook@...omium.org, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, hpa@...or.com,
linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
Subject: [PATCH 05/12] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when trusted_kernel is true
Allowing users to write to address space provides mechanisms that may permit
modification of the kernel at runtime. Prevent this if trusted_kernel is
true.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
---
drivers/char/mem.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index 15331a8..2cecab9 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -158,6 +158,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
unsigned long copied;
void *ptr;
+ if (get_trusted_kernel())
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
return -EFAULT;
@@ -496,6 +499,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
int err = 0;
+ if (get_trusted_kernel())
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
(unsigned long)high_memory - p);
--
1.8.5.3
--
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